China
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices -
2003
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
February 25, 2004
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is an authoritarian state in which, as
directed by the Constitution, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP or Party) is the
paramount source of power. Party members hold almost all top government, police,
and military positions. Ultimate authority rests with the 24-member political
bureau (Politburo) of the CCP and its 9-member standing committee. Leaders made
a top priority of maintaining stability and social order and were committed to
perpetuating the rule of the CCP and its hierarchy. Citizens lacked both the
freedom peacefully to express opposition to the Party-led political system and
the right to change their national leaders or form of government. Socialism
continued to provide the theoretical underpinning of national politics, but
Marxist economic planning has given way to pragmatism, and economic
decentralization increased the authority of local officials. The Party's
authority rested primarily on the Government's ability to maintain social
stability; appeals to nationalism and patriotism; Party control of personnel,
media, and the security apparatus; and continued improvement in the living
standards of most of the country's 1.3 billion citizens. The Constitution
provides for an independent judiciary; however, in practice, the Government and
the CCP, at both the central and local levels, frequently interfered in the
judicial process and directed verdicts in many high-profile cases.
The security apparatus is made up of the Ministries of State Security and
Public Security, the People's Armed Police, the People's Liberation Army (PLA),
and the state judicial, procuratorial, and penal systems. Civilian authorities
generally maintained effective control of the security forces. Security policy
and personnel were responsible for numerous human rights abuses.
The country's transition from a centrally planned to a market-based economy
continued. Although state-owned industry remained dominant in key sectors, the
Government has set up a commission to help reform major state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), privatized many small and medium SOEs, and allowed private entrepreneurs
increasing scope for economic activity. Rising urban living standards; greater
independence for entrepreneurs; the reform of the public sector, including
government efforts to improve and accelerate sales of state assets and to
improve management of remaining government monopolies; and expansion of the
non-state sector increased workers' employment options and significantly reduced
state control over citizens' daily lives.
The country faced many economic challenges, including reform of SOEs and the
banking system, growing unemployment and underemployment, the need to construct
an effective social safety net, and growing regional economic disparities. In
recent years, between 100 and 150 million persons voluntarily left rural areas
to search for better jobs and living conditions in the cities, where they were
often denied access to government-provided economic and social benefits,
including education and health care. During the year, the Government issued
regulations that relaxed controls over such migration and expanded the rights of
migrants to basic social services. In the industrial sector, continued
downsizing of SOEs contributed to rising urban unemployment that was widely
believed to be much higher than the officially estimated 4 percent, with many
sources estimating the actual figure to be as high as 20 percent. Income gaps
between coastal and interior regions, and between urban and rural areas,
continued to widen. The Government reported that urban per capita income in 2002
was $933 and grew by 12 percent over the previous year, while rural per capita
income was $300 and grew by 5 percent. Official estimates of the number of
citizens living in absolute poverty showed little change from the previous year,
with the Government estimating that 30 million persons lived in poverty and the
World Bank, using different criteria, estimating the number to be 100 to 150
million persons.
The Government's human rights record remained poor, and the Government
continued to commit numerous and serious abuses. Although legal reforms
continued, there was backsliding on key human rights issues during the year,
including arrests of individuals discussing sensitive subjects on the Internet,
health activists, labor protesters, defense lawyers, journalists, house church
members, and others seeking to take advantage of the space created by reforms.
Citizens did not have the right peacefully to change their government, and many
who openly expressed dissenting political views were harassed, detained, or
imprisoned. Authorities were quick to suppress religious, political, and social
groups that they perceived as threatening to government authority or national
stability.
Abuses included instances of extrajudicial killings, torture and mistreatment
of prisoners, forced confessions, arbitrary arrest and detention, lengthy
incommunicado detention, and denial of due process. Tibetan Lobsang Dondrub was
executed in January, a day after his appeal was denied, despite promises made to
diplomatic observers that the Supreme People's Court (SPC) would review his
case. In April, the Government officially concluded a nationwide "strike hard"
campaign against crime, which was implemented with particular force in Xinjiang
and included expedited trials and public executions. However, short-term
campaigns against specific types of crime were launched in some areas during the
year, and, in Xinjiang, particularly harsh treatment of suspected Uighur
separatists reportedly continued after the official end of the nationwide strike
hard campaign in April. Amnesty International (AI) reported that China executed
more persons than any other country.
The judiciary was not independent, and the lack of due process remained a
serious problem. Government pressure made it difficult for Chinese lawyers to
represent criminal defendants. A number of attorneys were detained for
representing their clients actively. During the year, Beijing defense lawyer
Zhang Jianzhong and Shanghai housing advocate Zheng Enchong both were sentenced
to multi-year prison terms in connection with their defense of controversial
clients. The authorities routinely violated legal protections in the cases of
political dissidents and religious figures. They generally attached higher
priority to suppressing political opposition and maintaining public order than
to enforcing legal norms or protecting individual rights.
Throughout the year, the Government prosecuted individuals for subversion and
leaking state secrets as a means to harass and intimidate. In July, lawyer Zhao
Changqing was sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment on charges of subversion for
his alleged role in drafting an open letter to the November 2002 16th Party
Congress urging democratization. At least five others who signed the letter were
also prosecuted on such charges. In October, former attorney Zheng Enchong was
sentenced to 3 years in prison for "disclosing state secrets" as an alleged
result of his providing information about labor and housing protests to a
foreign human rights organization. The same month, house church member Liu
Fenggang was detained on state secrets charges, allegedly for providing
information to overseas nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) about his
investigation into the destruction of house churches in Zhejiang Province.
Others detained, prosecuted, or sentenced on state secrets charges included
political dissident Yang Jianli and a number of Internet writers.
Over 250,000 persons were serving sentences, not subject to judicial review,
in "reeducation-through-labor" camps. In April, inmate Zhang Bin was beaten to
death in a reeducation-through-labor camp, prompting public debate on
reeducation through labor and calls to abolish the system.
The number of individuals serving sentences for the now-repealed crime of
counterrevolution was estimated at 500-600; many of these persons were
imprisoned for the nonviolent expression of their political views. Credible
sources estimated that as many as 2,000 persons remained in prison at year's end
for their activities during the June 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations.
The authorities released political activist Fang Jue in January. Many others,
including China Democracy Party co-founders Wang Youcai and Qin Yongmin;
Internet activists Xu Wei, Yang Zili, and Huang Qi; Uighur businesswoman Rebiya
Kadeer; journalist Jiang Weiping; labor activists Yao Fuxin, Xiao Yunliang, and
Liu Jingsheng; Catholic Bishop Su Zhimin; house church leaders Zhang Yinan, Liu
Fenggang and Xu Yonghai; Tibetan nun Phuntsog Nyidrol; Uighur historian Tohti
Tunyaz; and political dissident Yang Jianli remained imprisoned or under other
forms of detention.
The Government used the international war on terror as a justification for
cracking down harshly on suspected Uighur separatists expressing peaceful
political dissent and on independent Muslim religious leaders. The human rights
situation in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and in some ethnically Tibetan
regions outside the TAR also remained poor (see Tibet Addendum).
The Government maintained tight restrictions on freedom of speech and of the
press. The Government regulated the establishment and management of
publications, controlled the broadcast media, at times censored foreign
television broadcasts, and at times jammed radio signals from abroad. During the
year, publications were closed and otherwise disciplined for publishing material
deemed objectionable by the Government, and journalists, authors, academics, and
researchers were harassed, detained, and arrested by the authorities. In May,
Sichuan website manager Huang Qi and students belonging to the New Youth Study
Group received long prison sentences for their Internet essays encouraging
democracy. Others detained or convicted for their Internet activity included Tao
Haidong, Luo Yongzhong, Du Daobin, Yan Jun, Li Zhi, and Jiang Lijun. In
November, Beijing Normal University Student Liu Di and two others were released
on bail after a year of pretrial detention in connection with their Internet
postings. Internet use continued to grow in the country, even as the Government
continued and intensified efforts to monitor and control use of the Internet and
other wireless technology including cellular phones, pagers, and instant
messaging devices. During the year, the Government blocked many websites,
increased regulations on Internet cafes, and pressured Internet companies to
pledge to censor objectionable content. NGOs reported that 39 journalists were
imprisoned at year's end and that 48 persons had been imprisoned by the
Government for their Internet writing during China's brief history of Internet
use.
Initially, news about the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
was strictly censored, and some journals were closed because they disclosed
information about SARS. In April, the Government publicly acknowledged that the
SARS epidemic was more serious than previously admitted. Those accused of
interfering with SARS prevention were detained. Hundreds of Falun Gong
practitioners were detained on such accusations. Information about the spread of
HIV/AIDS also continued to be tightly controlled in some provinces. In June,
hundreds of police violently suppressed protests by persons infected with
HIV/AIDS in Xiongqiao village, Henan Province. Henan health official Ma Shiwen
was detained during the year on charges of disclosing state secrets after
providing information about the extent of the HIV epidemic in Henan Province to
website publishers.
The Government severely restricted freedom of assembly and association and
infringed on individuals' rights to privacy.
While the number of religious believers in the country continued to grow,
government respect for religious freedom remained poor. Members of unregistered
Protestant and Catholic congregations; Muslim Uighurs; Tibetan Buddhists,
particularly those residing within the TAR (see Tibet Addendum); and members of
folk religions experienced ongoing and, in some cases, increased official
interference, harassment, and repression. Protestant activists Zhang Yinan, Xu
Yonghai, Liu Fenggang, and Zhang Shengqi were among those detained or sentenced.
However, religious groups in some areas noted a greater freedom to worship than
in the past. The Government continued to enforce regulations requiring all
places of religious activity to register with the Government or to come under
the supervision of official, "patriotic" religious organizations. In some areas,
religious services were broken up and church leaders and adherents were
harassed, detained, or beaten. At year's end, scores of religious adherents
remained in prison because of their religious activities. No visible progress
was made in improving relations between the Government and the Vatican, although
both sides claimed to be ready to resume negotiations aimed at establishing
diplomatic relations. The Government continued its crackdown against the Falun
Gong spiritual movement, and thousands of practitioners remained incarcerated in
prisons, extrajudicial reeducation-through-labor camps, and psychiatric
facilities. Several hundred Falun Gong adherents reportedly have died in
detention due to torture, abuse, and neglect since the crackdown on Falun Gong
began in 1999.
Freedom of movement continued to be restricted. The Government denied the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) permission to operate along its
border with North Korea and deported several thousand North Koreans, many of
whom faced persecution upon their return. Abuse and detention of North Koreans
in the country was also reported. However, the Government continued to relax its
residence-based registration requirements and eliminated requirements for work
unit approval of certain personal decisions, such as getting married.
The Government did not permit independent domestic nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) to monitor human rights conditions. In September, the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education visited Beijing. Although the
Government extended "unconditional" invitations to the U.N. Special Rapporteur
for Torture, the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Religious Intolerance, the U.N.
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, and the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom (USCIRF), expected visits did not occur by year's end.
Conditions imposed by the Government caused negotiations with the U.N. Special
Rapporteur for Torture to break down and caused USCIRF twice to postpone a
planned trip.
Violence against women (including imposition of a birth limitation policy
coercive in nature that resulted in instances of forced abortion and forced
sterilization), prostitution, and discrimination against women, persons with
disabilities, and minorities continued to be problems.
Labor demonstrations, particularly those protesting nonpayment of back wages,
continued but were not as large or widespread as those in 2002. In May, Yao
Fuxin and Xiao Yunliang, leaders of the largest demonstrations in 2002, were
sentenced to prison terms on charges of subversion. Workplace safety remained a
serious problem, particularly in the mining industry. The Government continued
to deny internationally recognized worker rights, and forced labor in prison
facilities remained a serious problem. Trafficking in persons also remained a
serious problem.
However, significant legal reforms continued during the year. In June, the
Government abolished the administrative detention system of "custody and
repatriation" for migrants. Reforms also expanded legal aid and introduced
restrictions on extended unlawful detention. In October, the Third Party Plenum
formally approved a constitutional amendment that will, if approved at the March
2004 session of the National People's Congress, put the protection of individual
rights into China's constitution for the first time. At year's end, it remained
unclear how these reforms would be implemented and what effect they would have.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:
Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life
During the year, politically motivated and other arbitrary and unlawful
killings occurred. The official press reported extrajudicial killings, but no
nationwide statistics were available. Deaths in custody due to police use of
torture to coerce confessions from criminal suspects continued to occur. Beating
deaths during administrative detention also occurred and sparked public calls
for reform (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
Several hundred Falun Gong adherents reportedly have died in detention due to
torture, abuse, and neglect since the crackdown on Falun Gong began in 1999. For
example, Falun Gong groups alleged that more than 50 persons died in custody in
June through August, many from torture in detention camps.
Trials involving capital offenses sometimes took place under circumstances
where the lack of due process or a meaningful appeal bordered on extrajudicial
killing. NGOs reported over 1,000 executions during the year, including dozens
on June 26 to mark international anti-drug day. AI reported that China executed
more persons than any other country. In 2002, officials reportedly carried out
over 4,000 executions after summary trials as part of a nationwide "strike hard"
campaign against crime. The actual number of persons executed likely was far
higher than the number of reported cases. The Government regarded the number of
death sentences it carried out as a state secret but stated that the number of
executions decreased during the year. Some foreign academics estimated that as
many as 10,000 to 20,000 persons were executed each year.
b. Disappearance
In some areas, police targeted dissidents without family members for
detention or incarceration in psychiatric facilities. With no family to notify,
this practice in effect constituted disappearance.
The Government has used incommunicado detention. For example, in December
2002, the Government acknowledged that it was holding dissident Wang Bingzhang,
who along with two other individuals disappeared in Vietnam on June 26, 2002.
After several months of incommunicado detention, the other detainees, Zhang Qi
and Yue Wu, were released but, in January, Wang was convicted on charges of
espionage and terrorism and sentenced to life in prison. In February, his appeal
was denied. In July, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights found that
Wang's disappearance, arrest, and imprisonment violated international standards,
and he asked the Guangdong Provincial High Court in September to reconsider his
case. Wang also objected to being forced to attend political study sessions and
went on a hunger strike in prison as a protest. At year's end, the court had
taken no action.
As of year's end, the Government had not provided a comprehensive, credible
accounting of all those missing or detained in connection with the suppression
of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The law prohibits torture; however, police and other elements of the security
apparatus employed torture and degrading treatment in dealing with some
detainees and prisoners. The Prison Law forbids prison guards from extorting
confessions by torture, insulting prisoners' dignity, and beating or encouraging
others to beat prisoners. While senior officials acknowledged that torture and
coerced confessions were chronic problems, they did not take sufficient measures
to end these practices. Former detainees reported credibly that officials used
electric shocks, prolonged periods of solitary confinement, incommunicado
detention, beatings, shackles, and other forms of abuse. Recommendations from
the May 2000 report of the U.N. Committee Against Torture still had not been
fully implemented by year's end. These recommendations included incorporating a
definition of torture into domestic law, abolishing all forms of administrative
detention (including reeducation through labor), promptly investigating all
allegations of torture, and providing training courses on international human
rights standards for police.
During the year, police use of torture to coerce confessions from criminal
suspects continued to be a problem. The 2002 death in custody of Zeng Lingyun of
Chongqing Municipality remained unresolved. On July 26, 2002, public security
personnel detained Zeng on theft charges. On July 28, his family was informed
that he had died. Local officials initially told Zeng's family that he had been
shot by police, and the family noticed extensive bruises and a bullet wound on
the body.
Since the crackdown on Falun Gong began in 1999, there reportedly have been
several hundred deaths in custody of Falun Gong adherents, due to torture,
abuse, and neglect (see Section 2.c.).
The Government made some efforts to address the problem of torture during the
year. Some provincial governments issued regulations stipulating that judges and
police using torture to extract confessions from suspects would face dismissal.
The Government announced that evidence obtained through coerced confessions
would be excluded from trial in certain administrative cases (which include acts
akin to certain criminal misdemeanors as well as behavior punishable through
administrative detention, such as disruption to social order). Police officers
who tortured suspects faced dismissal and criminal prosecution in some cases.
For example, two police in Dandong, Liaoning Province, were sentenced to 1 and 2
years in jail in December, after torturing two suspects to death in 2001.
During the year, there were reports of persons, particularly Falun Gong
adherents, sentenced to psychiatric hospitals for expressing their political or
religious beliefs (see Section 1.d.).
Conditions in penal institutions for both political prisoners and common
criminals generally were harsh and frequently degrading. Prisoners and detainees
often were kept in overcrowded conditions with poor sanitation, and their food
often was inadequate and of poor quality. Many detainees relied on supplemental
food and medicines provided by relatives, but some prominent dissidents
reportedly were not allowed to receive supplemental food or medicine from
relatives. According to released political prisoners, in many provinces it was
standard practice for political prisoners to be segregated from each other and
placed with common criminals. Released prisoners reported that common criminals
have beaten political prisoners at the instigation of guards. Some prominent
political prisoners received better than standard treatment.
The 1994 Prison Law was designed, in part, to improve treatment of detainees
and increase respect for their legal rights; however, many provisions of this
law have not been effectively implemented. Some prisoners were able to use
administrative procedures provided for in this law to complain about prison
conditions. The Government also has created some "model" facilities, where
inmates generally received better treatment than those held in other facilities.
Chinese prison management relied on the labor of prisoners both as an element of
punishment and to fund prison operations (see Section 6.c.). During the year,
the Government established a pilot program in some locations to separate prison
enterprises from prison reform and punishment functions.
Adequate, timely medical care for prisoners continued to be a serious
problem, despite official assurances that prisoners have the right to prompt
medical treatment if they become ill. Political prisoners continued to have
difficulties in obtaining medical treatment, despite repeated appeals on their
behalf by their families and the international community. Those with health
concerns included China Democracy Party (CDP) co-founders Qin Yongmin and Wang
Youcai; Internet essayist Luo Yongzhang; democracy activists Hua Di and He Depu;
labor activists Xiao Yunliang, Yao Fuxin, Hu Shigen, Liu Jingsheng, and Zhang
Shanguang; Tibetan nun Phuntsog Nyidrol; religious prisoners Liu Fenggang and
Bishop Su Zhimin; dissident Wang Bingzhang; and Uighur businesswoman Rebiya
Kadeer. During the year, anti-corruption campaigner An Jun, Internet dissident
Xu Wei, and dissident Wang Bingzhang allegedly went on hunger strikes in prison.
Conditions in administrative detention facilities, such as
reeducation-through-labor camps, were similar to those in prisons. Two highly
publicized deaths in administrative detention prompted calls for an overhaul of
the system. In March, a university graduate, Sun Zhigang from Henan Province,
was beaten to death in a Guangzhou city custody and repatriation center after
being detained by police as a suspected illegal migrant. Sun did not have a
Guangzhou residency document, and police reportedly locked him in a custody and
repatriation facility because his accent revealed he was from a different
province. In the facility, inmates beat him to death, and some facility
employees allegedly knew of and encouraged the beating. Subsequently, criminal
charges were filed against 18 persons. One staff member of the facility was
executed, and several prisoners who allegedly inflicted the beating received
stiff jail terms or suspended death sentences. Police involved were given mostly
administrative punishments. Sun's death led to unprecedented public calls for
abolition of the custody and repatriation system of administrative detention for
illegal migrants, including petitions by legal scholars and National People's
Congress (NPC) members. On June 22, the State Council abolished the system and
called for the conversion of administrative detention centers into humanitarian
relief centers to support migrants, vagrants, and the homeless. At year's end,
the impact of these reforms remained uncertain.
In April, inmate Zhang Bin was tortured and beaten to death at the Huludao
City Correctional Camp, a reeducation-through-labor facility in Liaoning
Province, where he had reportedly been sentenced to 18 months as punishment for
theft. For 30 days, 9 inmates and the inmate labor boss reportedly beat Zhang,
stripped him naked, abused him with plastic pipes and hammers, applied hot
peppers and salt to his wounds, and doused him in cold water. After Zhang died
in an ambulance on the way to a hospital on April 16, 2 workers at the camp were
indicted on criminal charges of abuse of authority. In December, inmates charged
in the beating were sentenced to long prison terms, and the leader of the gang
who beat Zhang was given the death penalty. Zhang's death also prompted calls
for reform of reeducation through labor, including a petition by six
Guangzhou-based members of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference, but no such reforms had been made as of year's end.
In the wake of the Sun and Zhang deaths in custody, public security officials
admitted that these beating deaths were not isolated incidents. Sexual and
physical abuse and extortion were reported in some detention centers. Forced
labor in prisons and reeducation-through-labor camps was also common. At the
Xinhua Reeducation-Through-Labor Camp in Sichuan Province, inmates were forced
to work up to 16 hours per day breaking rocks or making bricks, according to
credible reports.
The Government generally did not permit independent monitoring of prisons or
reeducation-through-labor camps, and prisoners remained inaccessible to
international human rights organizations. Although the Government agreed to
invite the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Torture, this visit stalled in part
because of the Government's refusal to allow him to visit prisons without
advance notice (see Section 4). By year's end, the Government had not announced
any progress in talks with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
on an agreement for ICRC access to prisons, although there was some discussion
of ICRC opening an office in Beijing. Semi-monthly working-level meetings
intended to renew cooperation on the U.S.-China Prison Labor Memorandum of
Understanding continued during the year (see Section 6.c). A scheduled visit by
U.S. officials to discuss prison labor was postponed due to SARS.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Arbitrary arrest and detention remained serious problems. The law permits
authorities, in some circumstances, to detain persons without arresting or
charging them, and persons may be sentenced administratively to up to 3 years in
reeducation-through-labor camps and other similar facilities without a trial.
Because the Government tightly controlled information, it was impossible to
determine accurately the total number of persons subjected to new or continued
arbitrary arrest or detention. Official government statistics indicated that
there were 230,000 persons in reeducation-through-labor camps, while NGOs
claimed some 310,000 persons were in reeducation through labor during the year.
According to a 2001 article by the official news agency, 300
reeducation-through-labor facilities have held more than 3.5 million prisoners
since 1957. In addition, it was estimated that approximately 2 million persons
per year were detained in a form of administrative detention known as custody
and repatriation until that system was abolished in June after the beating death
of Sun Zhigang (see Section 1.c.). The Government also confined some Falun Gong
adherents, labor activists, and others to psychiatric hospitals. Approximately
500-600 individuals continued to serve sentences for the now-repealed crime of
counterrevolution. Many of these persons were imprisoned for the nonviolent
expression of their political views (see Section 1.e.).
The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) coordinates the country's law
enforcement, which is administratively organized into local, county, provincial,
and specialized police agencies. Recent efforts have been made to strengthen
historically weak regulation and management of law enforcement agencies;
however, judicial oversight is limited and checks and balances are absent. Many
police and law enforcement units in the country remained poorly trained and
lacked basic investigation skills. Corruption at the local level was widespread.
Police officers reportedly coerced victims, took individuals into custody
without due cause, arbitrarily collected fees from individuals charged with
crimes, and mentally and physically abused victims and perpetrators. State media
reported that the Government fired over 44,700 police officers for corruption
and abuse of authority or dereliction of duty during the year.
Extended, unlawful detention by security officials remained a serious
problem. The Supreme People's Procuratorate reported that, from 1998 through
2002, there were 308,182 persons detained for periods longer than permitted by
law. At a National People's Congress committee hearing, the Government
acknowledged that the problem of extended detention "has not been fundamentally
resolved" and varied by location.
Unlawful extended detention disproportionately affected political dissidents.
Dissident Yang Jianli was held without charges for over a year before his August
4 trial. At year's end, he remained in jail without a conviction or legal
justification for his extended detention. In June, the U.N. Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention found that China's pretrial detention of Yang Jianli
violated the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The release on bail of Internet writer
Liu Di after a year of pretrial detention, as well as the convictions of
democracy activist Jiang Lijun after a year of pretrial detention and of
attorney Zhang Jianzhong after more than 19 months of pre- and post-trial
detention, were results of public concern over the issue of unlawful extended
detention and a resulting government campaign to address the problem.
This campaign, addressing both pre- and post-trial detention, began in July
when the SPC, and later the MPS and Supreme People's Procuratorate, directed
courts and police to resolve cases and provide statistics about unlawful
extended detention. The MPS stated that police responsible for unlawful extended
detention would be prosecuted, and some police were prosecuted and jailed on
such charges during the year. At year's end, the SPC announced that Chinese
courts had reviewed all cases of unlawful extended detention by police and the
courts. According to state media, courts reviewed and solved 4,100 cases of
unlawful extended detention, releasing 7,658 detainees; only 91 cases remained
unresolved and required further examination.
According to the 1997 Criminal Procedure Law, police can unilaterally detain
a person for up to 37 days before releasing him or formally placing him under
arrest. After a suspect is arrested, the law allows police and prosecutors to
detain him for months before trial while a case is being "further investigated."
The law stipulates that authorities must notify a detainee's family or work unit
of his detention within 24 hours. However, in practice, failure to provide
timely notification remained a serious problem, particularly in sensitive
political cases. Under a sweeping exception, officials were not required to
provide notification if doing so would "hinder the investigation" of a case. In
some cases, police treated those with no immediate family more severely. Police
continued to hold individuals without granting access to family members or
lawyers, and trials continued to be conducted in secret. Detained criminal
suspects, defendants, their legal representatives, and close relatives were
entitled to apply for bail, but, in practice, few suspects were released pending
trial.
The Criminal Procedure Law does not address the reeducation-through-labor
system, which allows non-judicial panels of police and local authorities, called
Labor Reeducation Committees, to sentence persons to up to 3 years in
prison-like facilities. The committees could also extend an inmate's sentence
for an additional year. Defendants were legally entitled to challenge
reeducation-through-labor sentences under the Administrative Litigation Law.
They could appeal for a reduction in, or suspension of, their sentences;
however, appeals rarely were successful. Many other persons were detained in
similar forms of administrative detention, known as "custody and education" (for
example, for prostitutes and their clients) and "custody and training" (for
minors who committed crimes). Persons could be detained for long periods under
these provisions, particularly if they could not afford to pay fines or fees.
According to foreign researchers, the country had 20 "ankang" institutions
(high-security psychiatric hospitals for the criminally insane) directly
administered by the MPS. Some dissidents and other targeted individuals were
housed with mentally ill patients in these institutions. The regulations for
committing a person into an ankang psychiatric facility were not clear. Credible
reports indicated that a number of political and trade union activists,
"underground" religious believers, persons who repeatedly petitioned the
Government for redress of grievances, members of the banned China Democratic
Party, and hundreds of Falun Gong adherents were incarcerated in such facilities
during the year. These included Wang Miaogen, Wang Chanhao, Pan Zhiming, and Li
Da, who were reportedly held in an ankang facility run by the Shanghai Public
Security Bureau. According to NGO reports, more than 30 persons were committed
during 2002 to the Harbin Psychiatric Hospital against their will after
petitioning authorities for redress of various personal grievances. New
regulations issued during the year by some jurisdictions to control police
abuses required that all verifications of mental illness must be conducted in
hospitals appointed by provincial governments, but it was unknown what impact,
if any, the regulations would have in practice. A motion before the World
Psychiatric Association to expel China from the organization for using
psychiatric facilities to incarcerate political prisoners remained under
consideration during the year.
Arrests on charges of revealing state secrets, subversion, and common crimes
were used during the year by authorities to suppress political dissent and
social advocacy. For example, Shanghai housing advocate Zheng Enchong was
arrested on June 6 after he represented hundreds of residents forced from their
homes as a result of an urban redevelopment scheme. Henan health official Ma
Shiwen was reportedly detained for revealing state secrets after allegedly
providing information to NGOs about the HIV infection of thousands of villagers
through blood collection procedures. Police sometimes harassed and detained
relatives of dissidents (see Section 2.a.). Journalists also were detained or
threatened during the year, often when their reporting met with the Government's
or local authorities' disapproval (see Section 2.a.). Dozens of citizens writing
on the Internet or engaging in on-line chatrooms about political topics were
detained during the year (see Section 2.a.). Persons critical of official
corruption or malfeasance also frequently were threatened, detained, or
imprisoned. In December, Sichuan local official Li Zhi was sentenced to 8 years
in prison for "subverting state power" after writing on the Internet to expose
official corruption. In January 2002, Jiang Weiping, who had written a series of
articles exposing official corruption, was sentenced to 8 years in prison for
"subverting state power."
Local authorities used the Government's campaign against cults to detain and
arrest large numbers of religious practitioners and members of spiritual groups
(see Section 2.c.).
The campaign that began in 1998 against the China Democracy Party (CDP), an
opposition party, continued during the year. Dozens of CDP leaders, activists,
and members have been arrested, detained, or confined as a result of this
campaign. Since December 1998, at least 38 core leaders of the CDP have been
given severe punishments on subversion charges. Xu Wenli, Wang Youcai, and Qin
Yongmin were sentenced in 1998 to prison terms of 13, 12, and 11 years
respectively. While Xu Wenli was released on medical parole to the United States
in December 2002, Wang and Qin remained in prison. In March, Shanghai CDP leader
Han Lifa was detained reportedly for "soliciting prostitutes," a charge used in
the past to discredit dissidents. He was sentenced to 3 years' reeducation
through labor. Immediately before and after the 16th Party Congress in November
2002, authorities rounded up a number of the 192 activists, many of whom were
members of the CDP, in 17 provinces who had signed an open letter calling for
political reform and a reappraisal of the official verdict on the 1989 Tiananmen
massacre. Among those detained or sentenced to prison terms on subversion
charges during the year in connection with the open letter were lawyer Zhao
Changqing, He Depu, Sang Jiancheng, Ouyang Yi, Dai Xuezhong, and Jiang Lijun.
A nation-wide anti-crime "strike hard" campaign began in April 2001 and
continued early in the year before officially ending in April. It was
characterized by large-scale sentencing rallies and parades of condemned
prisoners through the streets of major cities, followed by public executions.
The campaign was implemented with special force in Xinjiang, and particularly
harsh treatment of suspected Uighur separatists reportedly continued there after
the official end of the campaign in April. According to official reports, 12,976
persons in Beijing alone were sentenced to death or prison for longer than 2
years during the 2-year campaign. Officials announced regional results of the
campaign during the summer, but no nationwide statistics were available.
Diplomatic officials were barred from a Beijing museum display showing results
of the campaign. Short-term campaigns against specific types of crime were
launched in some areas during the year.
The strike hard campaign in Xinjiang specifically targeted the "three evils"
of extremism, splittism, and terrorism as the major threats to Xinjiang's social
stability. Because the Government authorities in Xinjiang regularly grouped
together those involved in "ethnic separatism, illegal religious activities, and
violent terrorism," it was often unclear whether particular raids, detentions,
or judicial punishments targeted those peacefully seeking their goals or those
engaged in violence. Many observers raised concerns that the Government's war on
terror was a justification for cracking down harshly on suspected Uighur
separatists expressing peaceful political dissent and on independent Muslim
religious leaders (see Section 5).
Chinese law neither provides for a citizen's right to repatriate nor
otherwise addresses exile. The Government continued to refuse reentry to
numerous citizens who it considered to be dissidents, Falun Gong activists, or
troublemakers. Although some dissidents living abroad have been allowed to
return, dissidents released on medical parole and allowed to leave the country
were effectively exiled.
The Government's refusal to permit some former reeducation-through-labor camp
inmates to return to their homes constituted a form of internal exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution states that the courts shall, in accordance with the law,
exercise judicial power independently, without interference from administrative
organs, social organizations, and individuals. However, in practice, the
judiciary received policy guidance from both the Government and the Party, whose
leaders used a variety of means to direct courts on verdicts and sentences,
particularly in politically sensitive cases. At both the central and local
levels, the Government frequently interfered in the judicial system and dictated
court decisions. Trial judges decide individual cases under the direction of the
trial committee in each court. In addition, the Communist Party's Law and
Politics Committee, which includes representatives of the police, security,
procuratorate, and courts, has authority to review and influence court
operations; the Committee, in some cases, altered decisions. People's Congresses
also had authority to alter court decisions, but this happened rarely.
Corruption and conflicts of interest also affected judicial decision-making.
Judges were appointed by the people's congresses at the corresponding level of
the judicial structure and received their court finances and salaries from those
government bodies, which sometimes resulted in local politicians exerting undue
influence over the judges they appointed and financed.
The Supreme People's Court (SPC) is the highest court, followed in descending
order by the higher, intermediate, and basic people's courts. These courts
handle criminal, civil, and administrative cases, including appeals from
decisions by police and security officials to use reeducation through labor and
other forms of administrative detention. There were special courts for handling
military, maritime, and railway transport cases.
Corruption and inefficiency were serious problems in the judiciary as in
other areas (see Section 3). Safeguards against corruption were vague and poorly
enforced.
In recent years, the Government has taken steps to correct systemic
weaknesses in the judicial system and to make the system more transparent and
accountable to public scrutiny. State media reported that, from January 2002
through October 2003, prosecutors filed 7,402 cases against judicial officials
nationwide, involving 8,442 officials. Of these cases, 80 percent involved
suspected malfeasance and rights violations, while 20 percent involved
corruption and bribery. In 1999, the SPC issued regulations requiring all trials
to be open to the public, with certain exceptions, including cases involving
state secrets, privacy, and minors. The legal exception for cases involving
state secrets was used to keep politically sensitive proceedings closed to the
public and even to family members in some cases. Under the regulations,
"foreigners with valid identification" are to be allowed the same access to
trials as citizens. As in past years, foreign diplomats and journalists sought
permission to attend a number of trials only to have court officials reclassify
them as "state secrets" cases, thus closing them to the public. Since 1998, some
trials have been broadcast, and court proceedings have become a regular
television feature. A few courts published their verdicts on the Internet.
Lawsuits against the Government continued to increase as a growing number of
persons used the court system to seek legal recourse against government
malfeasance. Administrative lawsuits rose, with more than 100,000 such cases
filed in 2001, according to government statistics. Losses by plaintiffs dropped
from 35.9 percent in 1992 to 28.6 percent in 2001. In 2002, the SPC established
guidelines giving litigants the right to access government files to facilitate
lawsuits against government bodies. Decisions of any kind in favor of dissidents
remained rare.
Court officials continued efforts to enable the poor to afford litigation by
exempting, reducing, or postponing court fees. On September 1, new national
regulations went into effect expanding the category of cases eligible for legal
aid services and permitting those eligible to obtain legal aid as early as the
initial interrogation in criminal cases. Those seeking to obtain compensation
from government officials became eligible for legal aid services. From 2000 to
2002, the courts waived over $387 million (RMB 3.2 billion) in litigation costs.
According to the SPC's March report to the NPC, from 1998 through 2002, 2.83
million criminal cases were tried, and 3.22 million offenders were sentenced, up
16 and 18 percent, respectively, from the previous 5-year period. In 2001, the
country's courts handled 5,927,660 cases, 730,000 of which were criminal cases,
a 33 percent increase over the previous year, as well as more than 100,000
appeals of administrative decisions. Some 819,000 criminal defendants were
sentenced to jail terms of 5 years or more, life imprisonment, or death, during
the 5-year period, accounting for approximately 25 percent of the total.
Police and prosecutorial officials often ignored the due process provisions
of the law and of the Constitution. For example, police and prosecutors
subjected many prisoners to torture and severe psychological pressure to
confess, and coerced confessions frequently were introduced as evidence. The
Criminal Procedure Law forbids the use of torture to obtain confessions, but
does not expressly bar the introduction of coerced confessions as evidence. In
August, new public security regulations were announced banning the use of
torture to obtain confessions and prohibiting the use of coerced confessions in
certain administrative cases. However, the new regulations offer no mechanism
for a defendant in an administrative case to ensure that his coerced confession
is disregarded. Some provinces passed further regulations noting that police who
coerced defendants into confessing could be fired. Nonetheless, defendants who
failed to show the "correct attitude" by confessing their crimes often received
harsher sentences.
During the year, the conviction rate in criminal cases remained at
approximately 90 percent, and trials generally were little more than sentencing
hearings. In practice, criminal defendants often were not assigned an attorney
until a case was brought to court. The best that a defense attorney generally
could do in such circumstances was to get a sentence mitigated. In many
politically sensitive trials, which rarely lasted more than several hours, the
courts handed down guilty verdicts immediately following proceedings. There was
an appeals process, but no statistics were available on the results of appeals.
In practice, appeals rarely resulted in reversed verdicts.
The lack of due process was particularly egregious in death penalty cases.
There were 65 capital offenses, including financial crimes such as
counterfeiting currency, embezzlement, and corruption, as well as some other
property crimes. A higher court nominally reviewed all death sentences, but the
time between arrest and execution was often days and sometimes less, and reviews
consistently resulted in the confirmation of sentences. Minors and pregnant
women were expressly exempt from the death sentence. Tibetan Lobsang Dondrub was
convicted of involvement in bombings in Sichuan Province without due process and
executed the day after his appeal was rejected; despite assurances provided to
diplomats that his case would be reviewed by the SPC, no review ever occurred
(see Tibet Addendum). The Government regarded the number of death sentences it
carried out as a state secret, but officials stated that the number of
executions carried out decreased during the year, with a faster rate of decrease
in Beijing than in outlying provinces.
The 1997 Criminal Procedure Law falls short of international standards in
many respects. For example, it has insufficient safeguards against the use of
evidence gathered through illegal means, such as torture, and it does not
prevent extended pre- and post-trial detention (see Section 1.c. and 1.d.).
Appeals processes failed to provide sufficient avenue for review, and there were
inadequate remedies for violations of defendants' rights. Furthermore, under the
law, there is no right to remain silent, no right against double jeopardy, and
no law governing the type of evidence that may be introduced. The mechanism that
allows defendants to confront their accusers was inadequate; according to one
expert, only 1 to 5 percent of trials involved witnesses. Accordingly, most
criminal "trials" consisted of the procurator reading statements of witnesses
whom neither the defendant nor his lawyer ever had an opportunity to question.
Defense attorneys have no authority to compel witnesses to testify. Anecdotal
evidence indicated that implementation of the Criminal Procedure Law remained
uneven and far from complete, particularly in politically sensitive cases.
The Criminal Procedure Law gives most suspects the right to seek legal
counsel shortly after their initial detention and interrogation; however, police
often used loopholes in the law to circumvent defendants' right to seek counsel.
Defendants in sensitive political cases frequently found it difficult to find an
attorney. In some cases, defendants and lawyers in sensitive cases were not
allowed to speak during trials. Even in non-sensitive trials, criminal defense
lawyers frequently had little access to their clients or to evidence to be
presented during the trial. Defendants in only one of every seven criminal cases
had legal representation, according to credible reports citing internal
government statistics. Government-employed lawyers still depended on official
work units for employment, housing and other benefits, and therefore many were
reluctant to represent politically sensitive defendants. The percentage of
lawyers in the criminal bar reportedly declined from 3 percent in 1997 to 1
percent in 2001.
Some lawyers who tried to defend their clients aggressively continued to face
serious intimidation and abuse by police and prosecutors. For example, according
to Article 306 of the Criminal Law, defense attorneys could be held responsible
if their clients commit perjury, and prosecutors and judges in such cases have
wide discretion in determining what constitutes perjury. In December, prominent
Beijing defense attorney Zhang Jianzhong was sentenced to 2 years in prison on
charges of assisting in the fabrication of evidence in a major corruption case.
Originally denied the right to counsel, Zhang had been detained since May 3,
2002. He was due to be released in May 2004 after receiving credit for the 19
months he served in jail without a conviction. Chinese legal scholars claimed he
was singled out for being too effective at representing criminal defendants, and
approximately 600 lawyers signed a petition, which was submitted to the Supreme
People's Procuratorate and the Supreme People's Court, demanding that Zhang be
found not guilty. According to the All-China Lawyers Association, since 1997
more than 400 defense attorneys have been detained on similar charges. In
September, legal advisor Ma Wenlin asked the Shaanxi Provincial Higher People's
Court to overturn his 1999 conviction for "disturbing social order" based on his
representation of peasants in a lawsuit to reduce their tax burden. Ma was
released early in May, after 4 years in prison. In August, lawyers' professional
associations held a major conference on criminal defense law, continuing demands
for better protection of lawyers and their legitimate role in the legal process.
In recent years, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) drafted regulations to
standardize professional performance, lawyer-client relations, and the
administration of lawyers and law firms. The regulations set educational
requirements for legal practitioners, encourage free legal services for the
general public, grant lawyers formal permission to establish law firms, and
provide for the disciplining of lawyers. A growing number of lawyers organized
private law firms that were self-regulating and did not have their personnel or
budgets determined directly by the State. More than 60 legal aid organizations,
many of which handled both criminal and civil cases, have been established
around the country, and the MOJ established a nationwide legal services hotline.
The Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and the MOJ
also have issued regulations establishing standards, including an examination,
for judges and prosecutors, but those regulations are not uniformly enforced.
Recent regulations also require judicial or prosecutorial appointees to be law
school graduates with a minimum period of experience in legal practice. However,
a great number of sitting judges and procurators continued to serve despite
having little or no legal training.
During the year, Chinese and foreign lawyers, law professors, legal journals,
and jurists publicly pressed for faster and more systemic legal reform. Among
the suggested reforms were the introduction of a more transparent system of
discovery, the abolition of coerced confessions, abolition of all forms of
administrative detention, a legal presumption of innocence, an independent
judiciary, improved administrative laws, and adoption of a plea bargaining
system.
Government officials denied holding any political prisoners, asserting that
authorities detained persons not for their political or religious views, but
because they violated the law; however, the authorities continued to confine
citizens for reasons related to politics and religion. Thousands of political
prisoners remained incarcerated, some in prisons and others in labor camps.
According to human rights organizations, more citizens were in prison for
political crimes during the year than at any time since 1992. The Government did
not grant international humanitarian organizations access to political
prisoners.
Although the crime of "counterrevolution" was removed from the criminal code
in 1997, western NGOs estimated that approximately 500-600 persons remained in
prison for the crime. Hundreds of others were serving sentences under the State
Security Law, which covers similar crimes as the repealed crime of
counterrevolution. Persons detained for counterrevolutionary offenses included
labor activists Hu Shigen and Liu Jingsheng; writer Chen Yangbin; Inner
Mongolian activist Hada; and dissidents Han Chunsheng, Liang Qiang, Yu Zhijian,
Zhang Jingsheng, and Sun Xiongying. These prisoners rarely were granted sentence
reductions or parole. Foreign governments urged the Government to review the
cases of those charged before 1997 with counterrevolution and to release those
who had been jailed for nonviolent offenses under the old statute. During the
year, the Government held expert-level discussions with foreign officials on
conducting such a review.
AI has identified 211 persons who remained imprisoned or on medical parole
for their participation in the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations; other NGOs
estimated that as many as 2,000 persons remained in prison for their actions at
that time.
In January, the Government permitted the early release of political dissident
Fang Jue, and, in March, Tibetan nun Ngawang Sandrol was allowed to leave the
country. The Government also released a few other political prisoners after
granting them sentence reductions, including Internet activist Qi Yanchen and
labor activist Kang Yuchun. However, CDP co-founders Wang Youcai and Qin Yongmin;
Internet activists Xu Wei, Yang Zili, and Huang Qi; Uighur businesswoman Rebiya
Kadeer; journalist Jiang Weiping; labor activists Yao Fuxin, Xiao Yunliang, and
Liu Jingsheng; Catholic Bishop Su Zhimin; house church leaders Zhang Yinan, Liu
Fenggang and Xu Yonghai; Tibetan nun Phuntsog Nyidrol; Uighur historian Tohti
Tunyaz; and political dissident Yang Jianli, among many others, remained
imprisoned or under other forms of detention during the year. Political
prisoners generally benefited from parole and sentence reduction at
significantly lower rates than ordinary prisoners.
Criminal punishments could include "deprivation of political rights" for a
fixed period after release from prison, during which the individual is denied
the limited rights of free speech and association granted to other citizens.
Former prisoners also sometimes found their status in society, ability to find
employment, freedom to travel, and access to residence permits and social
services severely restricted. Economic reforms and social changes have
ameliorated these problems for nonpolitical prisoners in recent years. However,
former political prisoners and their families frequently still were subjected to
police surveillance, telephone wiretaps, searches, and other forms of
harassment, and some encountered difficulty in obtaining or keeping employment
and housing.
Officials confirmed that executed prisoners were among the sources of organs
for transplant but maintained that consent was required from prisoners or their
relatives in advance of the procedure. There was no national law governing organ
donations, but a Ministry of Health directive explicitly states that buying and
selling human organs and tissues is not allowed. On August 22, the first local
law regulating organ donation was passed in Shenzhen. It requires all organ
donations to be voluntary, prohibits the sale or trade of human organs, provides
for fines of $60,000 (RMB 500,000) for violations, and grants the Shenzhen Red
Cross sole authority to match donors and recipients. However, the law was
expected to have limited impact due to its limited geographical jurisdiction,
covering just the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. There were no reliable
statistics on how many organ transplants occurred using organs from executed
prisoners; however, anecdotal evidence, testimony of former officials and
doctors, and the numbers of post-transplant patients seeking follow-up care in
Western countries indicated that it is a significant number.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, Correspondence
The Constitution states that the "freedom and privacy of correspondence of
citizens are protected by law"; however, the authorities often did not respect
the privacy of citizens in practice. Although the law requires warrants before
law enforcement officials can search premises, this provision frequently was
ignored; moreover, the Public Security Bureau and the Procuratorate could issue
search warrants on their own authority. During the year, authorities monitored
telephone conversations, facsimile transmissions, e-mail, text-messaging, and
Internet communications. Authorities also opened and censored domestic and
international mail. The security services routinely monitored and entered
residences and offices to gain access to computers, telephones, and fax
machines. All major hotels had a sizable internal security presence, and hotel
guestrooms were sometimes searched for sensitive materials.
In urban areas, many persons depended on government-linked work units for
housing, healthcare, and other aspects of ordinary life. However, the work unit
and the neighborhood committee, which originally were charged with monitoring
activities and attitudes, have become less important as means of social and
political control, and government interference in daily personal and family life
continued to decline for most citizens. In some areas, citizens still were
required to apply for government permission before having a child, and the
Government continued to restrict the number of births. During the year, the
Government amended a regulation so that couples seeking to get married no longer
require permission from their work units.
Cases of forced entry by police officers continued to be reported. However,
after state media widely reported a police raid on the home of a married couple
watching a legal adult movie in Shaanxi Province, police authorities asserted
that private personal conduct not forbidden by law would no longer be subject to
police interference. For this and other reasons, government officials, including
Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang, emphasized in several public
statements that police must do a better job of respecting citizens' human
rights. In October, the Third Party Plenum formally approved a constitutional
amendment that will, if approved at the March 2004 session of the National
People's Congress, put the protection of individual rights into China's
constitution for the first time.
Some dissidents were under heavy surveillance and routinely had their
telephone calls monitored or phone service disrupted. The authorities blocked
some dissidents from meeting with foreigners during politically sensitive
periods. Police in Beijing ordered several dissidents not to meet with Western
journalists or foreign diplomats during the visits of high-level foreign
officials. The authorities also confiscated money sent from abroad that was
intended to help dissidents and their families.
Major political events and visits by high-ranking foreign officials routinely
sparked roundups of dissidents. For example, immediately before and after the
16th Party Congress in November 2002, authorities detained a number of activists
who had signed an open letter calling for political reform and a reappraisal of
the official verdict on the 1989 Tiananmen massacre (see Section 1.d.).
Similarly, dissidents reported greater surveillance and harassment from public
security officials during the National People's Congress in March, before the
June 4 anniversary of the Tiananmen crackdown, and before the October 1 National
Day.
Authorities also harassed relatives of dissidents and monitored their
activities. Security personnel kept close watch on relatives of prominent
dissidents, particularly during sensitive periods. For example, security
personnel followed the family members of political prisoners to meetings with
Western reporters and diplomats. Dissidents and their family members routinely
were warned not to speak with the foreign press. Police sometimes detained the
relatives of dissidents (see Section 2.a.).
Official poverty alleviation programs and major state projects have included
forced relocation of persons to new residences. The Government estimated that at
least 1.2 million persons have been relocated for the Three Gorges Dam project
on the Yangtze River.
Forced relocation because of urban redevelopment was common, sometimes
resulting in protests over relocation terms or compensation. The case of
Shanghai housing lawyer Zheng Enchong prompted significant public protest over
urban relocation. In October, Zheng was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment in
connection with his advocacy on behalf of hundreds of Shanghai residents
displaced in a controversial urban redevelopment project. Legal proceedings in
Zheng's case prompted many demonstrations, including one planned to involve
hundreds on National Day at Tiananmen Square. That protest was prevented by
police. Many of the protesters were detained for short periods in Beijing and
Shanghai. Some protest leaders were prosecuted and sentenced to reeducation
through labor (see Sections 2.b. and 3).
The Population and Family Planning Law, the country's first formal law on
this subject, entered into force on September 1, 2002. The National Population
and Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) enforces the law and formulates and
implements policies with assistance from the Birth Planning Association, which
had 1 million branches nationwide. The law is intended to standardize the
implementation of the Government's birth limitation policies; however,
enforcement continued to vary from place to place. The law grants married
couples the right to have a single child and allows eligible couples to apply
for permission to have a second child if they meet conditions stipulated in
local and provincial regulations. Many provincial regulations require women to
wait 4 years or more after their first birth before making such an application.
The law requires counties to use specific measures to limit the total number of
births in each county. The law further requires couples to employ birth control
measures. According to a September 2002 U.N. survey, the percentage of women who
select their own birth control method grew from 53 percent in 1998 to 83 percent
in 2000. The law requires couples who have an unapproved child to pay a "social
compensation fee" and grants preferential treatment to couples who abide by the
birth limits. Although the law states that officials should not violate
citizens' rights, neither those rights nor the penalties for violating them are
defined. The law provides significant and detailed sanctions for officials who
help persons evade the birth limitations.
The law delegates to the provinces the responsibility of drafting
implementing regulations, including establishing a scale for assessment of
social compensation fees, but State Council Decree 357 provides general
principles to guide local authorities. This decree also requires family planning
officials to obtain court approval for taking "forcible" action, such as
confiscation of property, against families that refuse to pay social
compensation fees.
The one-child limit was more strictly applied in the cities, where only
couples meeting certain conditions (e.g., both parents are only children) were
permitted to have a second child. In most rural areas (including towns of under
200,000 persons), where approximately two-thirds of citizens lived, the policy
was more relaxed, generally allowing couples to have a second child if the first
was a girl or disabled. Ethnic minorities, such as Muslim Uighurs and Tibetans,
were subject to much less stringent population controls (see Tibet Addendum). In
remote areas, limits generally were not enforced, except on government employees
and Party members. Local officials, caught between pressures from superiors to
show declining birth rates, and from local citizens to allow them to have more
than one child, frequently made false reports. The NPFPC estimated fertility at
1.8 births per woman, a figure roughly confirmed by the 2000 census. It claimed
that the yearly growth rate of the population has dropped to less than 1 percent
per year.
Authorities continued to reduce the use of targets and quotas, although over
1,900 of the country's 2,800 counties continued to use such measures.
Authorities using the target and quota system require each eligible married
couple to obtain government permission before the woman becomes pregnant. In
many counties, only a limited number of such permits were made available each
year, so couples who did not receive a permit were required to wait at least a
year before obtaining permission. Counties that did not employ targets and
quotas allowed married women of legal child-bearing age to have a first child
without prior permission.
The country's population control policy relied on education, propaganda, and
economic incentives, as well as on more coercive measures such as the threat of
job loss or demotion and social compensation fees. Psychological and economic
pressure were very common; during unauthorized pregnancies, women sometimes were
visited by birth planning workers who used the threat of social compensation
fees to pressure women to terminate their pregnancies. The fees were assessed at
widely varying levels and were generally extremely high. Reliable sources
reported that the fees ranged from one-half to eight times the average worker's
annual disposable income. Local officials have authority to adjust the fees
downward and did so in many cases. Additional disciplinary measures against
those who violated the limited child policy by having an unapproved child or
helping another to do so included the withholding of social services, higher
tuition costs when the child goes to school, job loss or demotion, loss of
promotion opportunity, expulsion from the Party (membership in which was an
unofficial requirement for certain jobs), and other administrative punishments,
including in some cases the destruction of property. These penalties sometimes
left women little practical choice but to undergo abortion or sterilization.
Rewards for couples who adhered to birth limitation laws and policies included
monthly stipends and preferential medical and educational benefits. In the cases
of families that already had two children, one of the parents was usually
pressured to undergo sterilization.
According to previously published local regulations in at least one province,
women who do not qualify for a Family Planning Certificate that allows them to
have a child must use an intrauterine device (IUD) or implant. The regulations
further require that women who use an IUD undergo quarterly exams to ensure that
it remains properly in place. In another province, rules state that "unplanned
pregnancies must be aborted immediately." In some counties, women of
childbearing age were required periodically to undergo pregnancy tests.
At the same time, the Government maintained that, due to economic development
and other factors such as small houses, both parents working full-time, and high
education expenses, couples in major urban centers often voluntarily limited
their families to one child.
The Population and Family Planning Law delegates to the provinces the
responsibility of implementing appropriate regulations to enforce the law. By
year's end, all provincial-level governments except the TAR had amended their
regulations. Anhui Province, for example, passed a law permitting 13 categories
of couples, including coal miners, some remarried divorcees, and some farm
couples, to have a second child. The law does not require such amendments,
however, unless existing regulations conflict with it. Existing regulations
requiring sterilization in certain cases, or mandatory abortion, are not
contradicted by the new law, which says simply that compliance with the birth
limits should "mainly" be achieved through the use of contraception.
Central Government policy formally prohibits the use of physical coercion to
compel persons to submit to abortion or sterilization. Because it is illegal,
the use of physical coercion was difficult to document. A few cases were
reported during the year, but most observers believed that the frequency of such
cases was declining. In May, officials in Anhui Province who tried to force a
woman to be sterilized were reprimanded after the woman informed national family
planning officials that she knew it was her right under the law to choose her
method of birth control.
Senior officials stated repeatedly that the Government "made it a principle
to ban coercion at any level," and the NPFPC has issued circulars nationwide
prohibiting birth planning officials from coercing women to undergo abortions or
sterilization against their will. However, the Government does not consider
social compensation fees and other administrative punishments to be coercive.
Under the State Compensation Law, citizens also may sue officials who exceed
their authority in implementing birth planning policy, and, in a few instances,
individuals have exercised this right.
Corruption related to social compensation fees reportedly decreased after the
2002 passage of State Council Decree 357, which established that collected
"social compensation fees" must be submitted directly to the National Treasury
rather than retained by local birth planning authorities. NPFPC officials
reported in 2002 that they responded to more than 10,000 complaints against
local officials.
In March, the U.N. Population Fund (UNFPA) concluded a 4-year pilot project
in 32 counties. Under this program, local birth planning officials emphasized
education, improved reproductive health services, and economic development, and
they eliminated the target and quota systems for limiting births. However, these
counties retained the birth limitation policy, including the requirement that
couples employ effective birth control methods, and enforced it through other
means, such as social compensation fees. Subsequently, 800 other counties also
removed the target and quota system and tried to replicate the UNFPA project by
emphasizing quality of care and informed choice of birth control methods. In
April, a new UNFPA program began in 30 counties. Under this program, officials
defined a list of "legitimate rights of reproduction according to law,"
including the rights to choose contraception and right to legal remedies, among
others.
In order to delay childbearing, the Marriage Law sets the minimum age at
marriage for women at 20 years and for men at 22 years. It continued to be
illegal in almost all provinces for a single woman to bear a child, and social
compensation fees have been levied on unwed mothers. The Government stated that
the practice of levying social compensation fees for "pre-marriage" births was
abolished on an experimental basis in some counties during the year. In 2002,
Jilin Province passed a law making it legal, within the limits of the birth
limitation law, for an unmarried woman who "intends to remain single for life"
to have a child.
Laws and regulations forbid the termination of pregnancies based on the sex
of the fetus, but because of the intersection of birth limitations with the
traditional preference for male children, particularly in rural areas, many
families used ultrasound technology to identify female fetuses and terminate
these pregnancies (see Section 5). The use of ultrasound for this purpose is
prohibited specifically by the Population Law and by the Maternal and Child
Health Care Law, both of which mandate punishment of medical practitioners who
violate the provision. During the year, new regulations were issued that
specifically forbid sex-selective abortions. According to the NPFPC, few doctors
have been charged under these laws. The most recent official figures, from
November 2000, put the overall male to female birth ratio at 116.9 to 100 (as
compared to the statistical norm of 106 to 100). For second births, the national
ratio was 151.9 to 100.
The Maternal and Child Health Care Law requires premarital and prenatal
examinations in part to determine whether couples have acute infectious diseases
or certain mental defects or are at risk for passing on debilitating genetic
diseases. The law states that abortion or sterilization are recommended in some
cases. In practice, however, most regions of the country still did not have the
medical capacity to determine accurately the likelihood of passing on
debilitating genetic diseases.
Lack of informed consent was a general problem in the practice of medicine
throughout the country.
As of 2001, the China Psychiatric Association no longer listed homosexuality
as a mental illness. Many gays and lesbians saw the move as a hopeful sign of
increased official tolerance. In major cities, gays and lesbians sometimes could
gather publicly for social purposes, but societal discrimination caused most
social gatherings to remain private.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution states that freedom of speech and freedom of the press are
fundamental rights to be enjoyed by all citizens; however, the Government
tightly restricted these rights in practice. The Government interpreted the
Party's "leading role," as mandated in the preamble to the Constitution, as
circumscribing these rights. The Government strictly regulated the establishment
and management of publications. The Government did not permit citizens to
publish or broadcast criticisms of senior leaders or opinions that directly
challenged Communist Party rule. The Party and Government continued to control
many and, on occasion, all print and broadcast media tightly and used them to
propagate the current ideological line. All media employees were under explicit,
public orders to follow CCP directives and "guide public opinion," as directed
by political authorities. Both formal and informal guidelines continued to
require journalists to avoid coverage of many politically sensitive topics.
These public orders, guidelines, and statutes greatly restricted the freedom of
broadcast journalists and newspapers to report the news and led to a high degree
of self-censorship. The Government continued an intense propaganda campaign
against the Falun Gong.
The Government continued to threaten, arrest, and imprison persons exercising
free speech. Internet essayists in particular were targeted.
Many individuals were jailed for their Internet publications during the year.
In January, Tao Haidong was sentenced in Urumqi, Xinjiang, to 7 years in prison
for "incitement to subvert state power" based on articles on democracy he posted
on the Internet. In May, Sichuan website manager Huang Qi, founder of a site for
missing persons from the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, was sentenced to 5 years in
prison. Also in May, four students belonging to the New Youth Study Group--Yang
Zili, Xu Wei, Jin Haike, and Zhang Honghai--who used the Internet to circulate
articles on political and social topics received sentences of 8 to 10 years for
subversion. Their appeal to the Supreme People's Court was denied in November.
Three of the four witnesses who testified against them at trial recanted their
stories, but the SPC refused to hear testimony from these witnesses on appeal.
In October, Internet essayist Luo Yongzhong from Jilin Province was sentenced to
3 years in prison after publishing articles on overseas websites calling for
democracy and human rights. On October 29, Internet writer Du Daobin in Hubei
Province was detained and later charged with distributing articles that
"subverted state power." At year's end, he was awaiting trial. The legal
credentials of Du's attorney were cancelled because he agreed to represent Du.
In November, Beijing Normal University student Liu Di, website publisher Li
Yibin, and Wu Yiran were released on bail after a year in detention. The court
returned their file to prosecutors because of insufficient evidence but
sentenced their alleged confederate Jiang Lijun to 4 years in prison for
subversion. On December 8, Xian teacher Yan Jun was sentenced to 2 years for
subversion based on his Internet postings. On December 10, Sichuan local
government official Li Zhi was sentenced to 8 years for subversion in connection
with his on-line writings about corruption and democracy. Sichuan Internet
writer Ouyang Yi has been detained since December 2002 on charges of incitement
to subvert state power. He was tried on October 15, but no verdict in his case
was issued by year's end. In December, factory worker Kong Youping was detained
for posting political articles and poems on the Internet. The NGO Reporters
Without Borders reported that, between November 1 and December 15 alone, 9
persons were convicted and sentenced to prison terms of 2 to 10 years in jail
for putting messages critical of the Government on the Internet. The group named
China "the biggest jail in the world for cyberdissidents," stating that the
country has jailed 48 persons for their Internet writing in recent years.
Journalists who reported on sensitive topics also continued to suffer
harassment, detention, and imprisonment. For example, South Korean
photojournalist Seok Jae Hyun was imprisoned in January while photographing
North Korean refugees trying to board boats headed for South Korea and Japan
(see Section 2.d.). In May, he was sentenced to 2 years in prison. Reporter
Jiang Weiping, who had written a series of articles exposing official corruption
in Liaoning Province, remained in prison, although his sentence was reduced from
8 to 6 years. The Committee to Protect Journalists again assessed China as "the
world's leading jailer of journalists," with 39 journalists imprisoned at year's
end.
Some Chinese remained active and continued to speak out, despite the
Government's restrictions on freedom of speech. For example, in April, Dr. Jiang
Yanyong disclosed that the spread of SARS in Beijing, particularly in military
hospitals, had been significantly under-reported. This disclosure ultimately
contributed to broader acknowledgment of the extent of the spread of SARS. In
June, scholar Cao Siyuan convened a symposium that proposed constitutional
amendments to establish a Constitutional Court, incorporate human rights,
provide "freedom of speech, publication, and association without pre-approval,"
and to allow direct elections. While neither person was formally detained, both
were followed by public security officials and at times forbidden from contact
with foreigners or the media.
There were a few privately owned print publications, but they were subject to
pre- and post-publication censorship. There were no privately owned television
or radio stations, and all programming had to be approved by the Government.
The Communist Party continued to control tightly media and academic
discussion of many political topics. In March, reporting about the National
People's Congress was strictly controlled, and the Beijing newspaper 21st
Century World Herald was closed for publishing articles on political reform
deemed too controversial. In June, the weekly newspaper Beijing Xinbao was
closed and its editors fired after it published an article that mocked Party
officials. In July, the Government issued a directive known as "The Three
Forbiddens." According to western media reports, it banned open discussion of
constitutional reform, political reform, and reconsideration of the June 4, 1989
Tiananmen movement. More broadly, in a June meeting, the Communist Party's
Propaganda Department advised all media to avoid the following sensitive topics:
Dr. Jiang Yanyong's communication with foreigners about SARS, the Sun Zhigang
case (see Section 1.c.), corruption cases against Shanghai-based businessman
Zhou Zhengyi and Chinese/Dutch national Yang Bin, an April submarine accident
that killed all 70 sailors on board, and nuclear weapons in the DPRK.
Censorship related to SARS was particularly controversial. On February 11,
Guangzhou municipal authorities held a press conference announcing over 300 SARS
cases in Guangzhou. Afterward, from February through April, domestic news
outlets were prohibited from discussing the disease. Reporting about the causes
and extent of SARS was also strictly controlled. For example, in February,
Guangdong Province's Southern Metropolitan Daily newspaper was sanctioned for
publishing articles that contradicted the Government line that SARS was caused
by the chlamydia virus. On April 14, the Government publicly acknowledged that
the SARS epidemic was more serious than previously admitted, and it punished
some officials for underreporting SARS cases. Some hailed this as a new sign of
openness by the Government. The Government held live televised press conferences
to answer questions about SARS. However, newspapers and magazines whose
reporting on SARS exceeded limits set by government censors continued to face
closure and other sanctions. The June 20 edition of Caijing, an influential
business news magazine, was withdrawn from newsstands. It contained an article
on the impact of SARS and another on a bank loan scandal linked to Government
officials. Caijing's previous edition had published an interview with SARS
informant Dr. Jiang Yanyong.
Discussion of corruption also was tightly controlled. Newspapers could not
report on corruption without government and Party approval, and publishers
published such material at their own risk. In recent years, journalists and
sometimes editors have been harassed, detained, threatened, and even imprisoned
for reporting on subjects that met with the Government's or local authorities'
disapproval, including corruption. During the year, journalists and editors who
exposed corruption scandals frequently faced problems with the authorities, and
the Government continued to close publications and punish journalists for
printing material deemed too sensitive.
Government restrictions on the press and the free flow of information
continued to prevent accurate reporting on the spread of HIV/AIDS. This problem
was particularly acute in Henan Province. Henan health official Ma Shiwen was
detained for several months before his release in October. Ma had allegedly
provided information to NGOs about villagers who became infected with HIV after
selling blood (see Section 1.d.). Henan provincial officials attempted to
prevent 77-year-old Dr. Gao Yaojie, an advocate for AIDS orphans, from attending
an AIDS forum at Beijing's Qinghua University in November.
For several years, journalists openly have called for legislation granting
press freedom protection, without success. New regulations reported during the
year required government officials to accept supervision by the media and public
on all matters except those involving state security.
The Government kept tight control over the foreign press during the year and
continued efforts to prevent foreign media "interference" in internal affairs.
The international edition of Time Magazine has been banned since an article
appeared in 2001 on the Falun Gong.
The publishing industry consists of three kinds of book businesses:
approximately 560 government-sanctioned publishing houses, smaller independent
publishers that cooperated with official publishing houses to put out more
daring publications, and an underground (illicit) press. The government-approved
publishing houses were the only organizations legally permitted to print books.
The Communist Party exerted control over the publishing industry by preemptively
classifying certain topics as off-limits; selectively rewarding with promotions
and perks those publishers, editors, and writers who adhered to Party
guidelines; and punishing those who did not adhere to Party guidelines with
administrative sanctions and blacklisting. Some independent publishers took
advantage of a loophole in the law to sign contracts with government publishing
houses to publish politically sensitive works. These works generally were not
subjected to the same multi-layered review process as official publications of
the publishing houses.
Underground printing houses have been targets of periodic campaigns to stop
all illegal publications (including pornography and pirated computer software
and audiovisual products). These campaigns had the effect of restricting the
availability of politically sensitive books. State-run media reported that over
300,000 pirated or pornographic books were destroyed in a public event held in
July in Beijing.
Many intellectuals and scholars, anticipating that books or papers on
political topics would be deemed too sensitive to be published, exercised
self-censorship. Overt intervention by the State Press and Publications
Administration and Party Propaganda Department mostly occurred after
publication. In areas such as economic policy or legal reform, there was far
greater official tolerance for comment and debate. Criticism of Central
Government authorities continued to remain largely off-limits. Among books
banned during the year were a new biography of former Premier Zhou Enlai, "The
True Face of China's June Fourth," and "The Destruction of China." Books once
published legitimately and circulated widely, such as "I Tell the Truth to the
Premier," a controversial indictment of the Party's rural policies, were
reportedly ordered off shelves during the year. In March 2002, the Department of
Cultural Affairs in Urumqi, Xinjiang, ordered the destruction of thousands of
books on Uighur history and culture. The books detailing and documenting Uighur
history originally had been published with the approval of the authorities.
Content about the Tiananmen Square student movement and the Dalai Lama, among
other passages, was censored in U.S. Senator Hillary Clinton's book, "Living
History." Chinese publishers reported that increasing commercialization of their
industry led to tension between ideological constraints and market imperatives.
In June, the Government ended the practice of forcing government work units
to subscribe to official newspapers, forcing many official newspapers to compete
for readership or face insolvency.
The authorities continued to jam, with varying degrees of success, Chinese-,
Uighur-, and Tibetan-language broadcasts of the Voice of America (VOA), Radio
Free Asia (RFA) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). English-language
broadcasts on VOA generally were not jammed, unless they immediately followed
Chinese-language broadcasts, in which case portions of the English-language
broadcasts were sometimes jammed. Government jamming of RFA and BBC appeared to
be more frequent and effective. Despite jamming, in the absence of an
independent press, overseas broadcasts such as VOA, BBC, RFA, and Radio France
International had a large audience, including activists, ordinary citizens, and
even government officials.
The Government prohibited some foreign and domestic films from appearing in
the country. Television broadcasts of foreign programming, which largely were
restricted to hotel and foreign residence compounds, also suffered from
occasional censorship of topics including sensitive political issues and SARS.
The Government continued to encourage expanded use of the Internet; however,
it also took steps to increase monitoring of the Internet and continued to place
restrictions on the information available. While only a very small percentage of
the population accessed the Internet, use among intellectuals and opinion
leaders was widespread and growing rapidly. Young persons, both urban and rural,
accounted for the greatest number of Internet users. According to a
quasi-government report, the number of Internet users at the end of 2002 was
59.1 million. During the year, industry officials estimated the number of users
at 80-100 million, with only 27 percent of those in the urban centers of
Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.
China's Internet control system employed more than 30,000 persons and was
allegedly the largest in the world. According to a 2002 Harvard University
report, the Government blocked at least 19,000 sites during a 6-month period and
may have blocked as many as 50,000. At times, the Government blocked the sites
of some major foreign news organizations, health organizations, educational
institutions, Taiwanese and Tibetan businesses and organizations, religious and
spiritual organizations, democracy activists, and sites discussing the June 4
Tiananmen massacre. The number of blocked sites appeared to increase around
major political events and sensitive dates. The authorities reportedly began to
employ more sophisticated technology enabling the selective blocking of specific
content rather than entire websites in some cases. Such technology was also used
to block e-mails containing sensitive content. The Government generally did not
prosecute citizens who received dissident e-mail publications, but forwarding
such messages to others sometimes did result in detention. Internet usage
reportedly was monitored at all terminals in public libraries.
The Ministry of Information Industry regulated access to the Internet while
the Ministries of Public and State Security monitored its use. Regulations
prohibit a broad range of activities that authorities have interpreted as
subversive or as slanderous to the state, including the dissemination of any
information that might harm unification of the country or endanger national
security. Promoting "evil cults" was banned, as was providing information that
"disturbs social order or undermines social stability." Internet service
providers (ISPs) were instructed to use only domestic media news postings,
record information useful for tracking users and their viewing habits, install
software capable of copying e-mails, and immediately end transmission of
so-called subversive material. Many ISPs practiced extensive self-censorship to
avoid transgressing the very broadly worded regulations. A study released in May
by Reporters Without Borders reported that only 30 percent of messages with
"controversial content" were allowed onto Chinese "chatroom" websites. The
remaining 70 percent of messages were filtered out by censors or removed by the
site host.
The State Council has promulgated a comprehensive list of prohibited Internet
activities, including using the Internet to "incite the overthrow of the
Government or the Socialist system" and to "incite division of the country,
harming national unification."
In addition to imprisoning several persons during the year for disseminating
information through the Internet, the Government detained several individuals
for using the Internet to express support for other detained Internet activists.
NGOs reported that several people were detained during the year for expressing
support for detained Beijing Normal University Internet writer Liu Di. Those
detained for expressing on-line support for Liu included Kong Youping, Yuan
Langsheng, Cai Lujun, Luo Changfu, and a 17-year old Henan girl identified only
as Zheng. Liu Di's case sparked this reaction because she herself was detained
for expressing sympathy for another Internet activist, Sichuan website manager
Huang Qi. In November, Liu was released on bail after a court found that the
evidence against her was insufficient; however, some persons detained for
supporting her remained in custody at year's end (see Section 1.d.).
In 2002, the Government began a "Public Pledge on Self Discipline for China's
Internet Industry" drive. More than 300 companies signed up, including the
popular Sina.com and Sohu.com, as well as foreign-based Yahoo!'s China division.
Those who signed the pledge agreed not to spread information that "breaks laws
or spreads superstition or obscenity." They also promised to refrain from
"producing, posting, or disseminating pernicious information that may jeopardize
state security and disrupt social stability."
In 2002, the country had more than 200,000 Internet cafes. In response to the
health crisis caused by SARS, the authorities closed all of the nation's
Internet cafes on April 27. Beijing cafes stayed closed until August, while
cafes in Shanghai and Sichuan reopened sooner.
During the year, the Government announced new plans to censor simple
messaging system text messages distributed by mobile telephone. The country's
largest service provider, China Mobile, reported in July that its customers sent
an estimated 40 billion text messages in 2002.
The Government did not respect academic freedom and continued to impose
ideological controls on political discourse at colleges, universities, and
research institutes. Scholars and researchers reported varying degrees of
control regarding issues they could examine and conclusions they could draw. For
example, several professors were warned against calling for abolition of
reeducation through labor after the beating death of inmate Zhang Bin (see
Section 1.c.). Participants at a June conference on constitutional reform faced
harassment by public security officials. Government decrees, such as the "three
forbiddens," significantly interfered with academic freedom. Scholar Xu Zerong
remained in prison for "illegally providing state secrets" by sending sensitive
reference materials on the Korean War to a contact in Hong Kong.
The Government continued to use political attitudes as criteria for selecting
persons for government-sponsored study abroad, but did not impose such
restrictions on privately sponsored students, who constituted the majority of
students studying abroad.
Researchers residing abroad also have been subject to sanctions from the
authorities when their work did not meet with official approval.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the
Government severely restricted this right in practice. The Constitution
stipulates that such activities may not challenge "Party leadership" or infringe
upon the "interests of the State." Protests against the political system or
national leaders were prohibited. Authorities denied permits and quickly moved
to suppress demonstrations involving expression of dissenting political views.
At times, police used excessive force against demonstrators. Demonstrations
with political or social themes were often broken up quickly and violently. The
most widely publicized demonstrations in recent years were those of the Falun
Gong spiritual movement. The Government continued to wage a severe political,
propaganda, and police campaign against the Falun Gong movement. Since the
Government banned the Falun Gong in 1999, mere belief in the discipline, without
any outward manifestation of its tenets, has been sufficient grounds for
practitioners to receive punishments ranging from loss of employment to
imprisonment, and in many cases, to suffer torture and death (see Sections 1.a.
and 2.c.). In many cases, Falun Gong practitioners were subject to close
scrutiny by local security personnel, and their personal mobility was tightly
restricted, particularly at times when the Government believed public protests
were likely.
The number of protests by individuals or small groups of Falun Gong
practitioners at Tiananmen Square remained very low during the year. Some
observers attributed this to the effectiveness of the sustained government
crackdown, which, by the end of 2001, had essentially eliminated public
manifestations of the movement. Authorities also briefly detained foreign
practitioners who attempted to unfurl banners on Tiananmen Square or pass out
leaflets, in most cases deporting them after a few hours.
In many cases, the authorities dealt with demonstrations about economic
issues more leniently than with those that addressed political issues, but some
economic demonstrations were dispersed by force. During the year, Ministry of
Public Security publications indicated that the number of demonstrations was
growing and that protesters were becoming more organized. Some of these
demonstrations included thousands of participants.
The vast majority of legal and illegal demonstrations that occurred during
the year concerned economic and social issues such as housing, health, and
welfare. Labor protests over the downsizing of SOEs and resulting unemployment
in the country's northeastern provinces continued but were smaller in scale than
in 2002. However, protests by workers seeking unpaid wages continued throughout
the country, including among migrant laborers and construction workers who often
were paid in one installment before Chinese New Year and who demonstrated when
employers withheld their salaries or underpaid them (see Section 6.b.). In May,
labor leaders Yao Fuxin and Xiao Yunliang received prison sentences of 7 and 4
years, respectively, for their roles in leading large 2002 protests by factory
workers demanding backpay and other benefits (see Section 6.b.). The Government
denied requests by Liaoyang workers for a permit to protest Yao and Xiao's
imprisonment. In April, some 200 persons reportedly protested the construction
of a hospital for quarantining SARS patients between Beijing and Tianjin
municipalities. Similar protests over SARS quarantine hospitals were reported in
other provinces, with some resulting in arrests. Protests by persons with
HIV/AIDS occurred in Henan Province and other central provinces and were
sometimes met with violence or arrests. On May 17, 100 AIDS patients protested
lack of health care in Wenlou village hospital and at least one protester
reportedly was severely beaten. In June, after a few HIV/AIDS protesters were
detained in Xiongqiao village, Henan Province, hundreds of police officers
reportedly were sent into the village, where they beat several protesters and
detained over a dozen others. The scope of police reaction produced widespread
international concern. Demonstrations of over 100 persons protesting property
relocation resulted in arrests in Shanghai. On August 28, in Shanghai, over 200
persons demonstrated to protest the trial of attorney Zheng Enchong, who
represented residents dislocated in an urban relocation scheme. The
demonstration reportedly resulted in arrests when police sought to disperse the
crowd. Before National Day on October 1, security officials briefly detained
more than 80 persons for their plans to participate in a Tiananmen Square
protest about urban development and the relocation of residents.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the Government
restricted this right in practice. Communist Party policy and government
regulations require that all professional, social, and economic organizations
officially register with, and be approved by, the Government. Ostensibly aimed
at restricting secret societies and criminal gangs, these regulations also
prevent the formation of truly autonomous political, human rights, religious,
spiritual, environmental, labor, and youth organizations that might directly
challenge government authority. Since 1999, all concerts, sports events,
exercise classes, or other meetings of more than 200 persons require approval
from Public Security authorities.
No laws or regulations specifically govern the formation of political
parties. The Government continued to use surveillance, detention, and prison
terms to suppress the CDP (see Section 3).
According to government statistics, at the end of 2002, there were
approximately 133,000 social organizations, including 1,712 national-level and
cross-provincial organizations, 20,069 provincial organizations, and 52,386
local and county-level organizations registered with the Ministry of Civil
Affairs. There were 111,000 private, nonprofit corporations registered. Experts
estimated that there were at least 1 million, and perhaps as many as 2 million,
unregistered NGOs. Although these organizations all came under some degree of
government control, some were able to develop their own agendas. Some had
support from foreign secular and religious NGOs. Some were able to undertake
limited advocacy roles in such public interest areas as women's issues, the
environment, health, and consumer rights. NGOs were required to register with
the Government, which has 2 months in which to grant approval. To register, an
NGO must obtain an organizational sponsor, have an official office, and hold a
minimal amount of funds (for local-level NGOs, at least $3,600 (RMB 30,000); for
national-level groups, at least $12,000 (RMB 100,000)). According to government
guidelines, NGOs must not advocate non-party rule, damage national unity, or
upset ethnic harmony. Groups that disobeyed guidelines and unregistered groups
that continued to operate could face administrative punishment or criminal
charges. During the year, the Beijing Municipal Civil Affairs Bureau ordered 51
organizations to close for failure to register. It was difficult to estimate how
many groups may have been discouraged from organizing NGOs because of these
regulations. However, preexisting groups reported little or no additional
interference by the Government since NGO registration regulations came into
effect in 1998.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for freedom of religious belief and the freedom not
to believe; however, the Government sought to restrict religious practice to
government-sanctioned organizations and registered places of worship and to
control the growth and scope of the activity of religious groups. There are five
official religions: Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism. A
government-affiliated association monitored and supervised the activities of
each of the five faiths. Membership in religions was growing rapidly. While the
Government generally did not seek to suppress this growth outright, it tried to
control and regulate religious groups to prevent the rise of sources of
authority outside the control of the Government and the Party.
Overall, government respect for religious freedom remained poor. Even though
freedom to participate in religious activity increased in many areas of the
country, crackdowns in some locations against unregistered groups, including
underground Protestant and Catholic groups; Muslim Uighurs; and Tibetan
Buddhists (see Tibet Addendum) continued. The Government continued its
repression of groups that it determined to be "cults" and of the Falun Gong
spiritual movement in particular. During the SARS crisis, the Government
arrested hundreds of Falun Gong adherents and others whom it accused of
preaching doomsday messages and disrupting anti-SARS activity. The atmosphere
created by the nationwide campaign against Falun Gong reportedly had a spillover
effect on unregistered churches, temples, and mosques in many parts of the
country.
All religious groups and spiritual movements were required to register with
the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA, formerly known as the
central Religious Affairs Bureau) or its provincial and local offices (still
known as Religious Affairs Bureaus (RABs)). SARA and the RABs were responsible
for monitoring and judging the legitimacy of religious activity. SARA and the
Communist Party's United Front Work Department provided policy "guidance and
supervision" over implementation of government regulations on religious
activity. In December 2001, all members of the Politburo Standing Committee
attended a Party Work Conference on religion at which then-President Jiang Zemin
and then-Premier Zhu Rongji gave speeches praising the social work being done by
numerous religious institutions. They urged "mainstream" religious groups to
register with the Government and, at the same time, called for stepped-up
measures to eliminate "non-mainstream" religious groups.
This national campaign to require religious groups and places of worship to
register or to come under the supervision of official "patriotic" religious
organizations continued and, in some places, intensified during the year. Some
groups registered voluntarily, some registered under pressure, some avoided
officials in an attempt to avoid registration, and authorities refused to
register others. Some unofficial groups reported that authorities refused them
registration without explanation. The Government contended that these refusals
were mainly the result of failure to meet requirements concerning facilities and
meeting spaces. Many religious groups were reluctant to comply with the
regulations out of principled opposition to state control of religion or due to
fear of adverse consequences if they revealed, as required, the names and
addresses of church leaders and members.
However, in some areas, supervision of religious activity was minimal, and
registered and unregistered churches were treated similarly by authorities.
Coexistence and cooperation between official and unofficial churches, both
Catholic and Protestant, in such areas were close enough to blur the line
between the two. In some areas, congregants worshiped in both types of churches.
In others, underground churches procured Bibles with the help of colleagues in
registered churches. In many areas, small house churches and "family" churches
were generally tolerated by the authorities, so long as they remained small and
unobtrusive. Some of these churches reportedly encountered difficulty when their
memberships became too large, when they arranged for the use of facilities for
the specific purpose of conducting religious activities, or when they forged
links with other unregistered groups or when links with overseas organizations
came to light. Official churches also sometimes have faced harassment when local
authorities wished to acquire the land on which a church was located. In
addition to refusing to register churches, in recent years there have been
reports that RAB officials demanded illegal "donations" from churches in their
jurisdictions in order to raise revenue.
Leaders of unauthorized groups were sometimes the targets of harassment,
interrogation, detention, and physical abuse. Police closed scores of
"underground" mosques, temples, seminaries, Catholic churches, and Protestant
"house churches," including many with significant memberships, properties,
financial resources, and networks. Authorities particularly targeted unofficial
religious groups in locations where there were rapidly growing numbers of
unregistered churches, or in places of long-seated conflict between official and
unofficial churches, such as with Catholics in Baoding, Hebei Province, and
Chengle, Fujian Province.
The Government intensified pressure against Protestant house churches and
their leaders during the year. In April and May, Protestant house churches in
Anshan, Liaoning Province, reportedly were raided and worshippers detained. In
June, six house churches in locations across the Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region were reportedly closed by authorities and their leaders detained. In
June, underground Christians in Funing County, Yunnan Province, were detained
for several days after they attended a meeting with local officials to
ostensibly discuss registration. Also in June, an unofficial seminary in Kunming,
Yunnan Province, was closed and some of the students were detained. In
September, house church historian Zhang Yinan and legal advisor to the South
China Church Xiao Biguang were among approximately 100 Christians detained in
Nanyang, Henan Province. While Xiao was released a month later, Zhang was
sentenced to 2 years of reeducation through labor. He was reportedly beaten in
the camp. In October, Beijing-based house Christian Liu Fenggang was detained in
Xiaoshan, Zhejiang Province, for conducting an investigation into reports of
church demolitions and detention of leaders in the Local Assembly ("Little
Flock") church. In July, a large church was reportedly closed by police; many
worshippers were detained briefly and church leaders were "invited to attend a
seminar" for a number of days before being permitted to return home. Liu was
charged with illegally providing state secrets to foreign entities, a charge
activists believe was related to Liu's providing information about his
investigation to overseas NGOs. Beijing police also seized Liu's computer
equipment and files. Two other house Christians, Beijing homeless advocate Dr.
Xu Yonghai and Jilin Internet writer Zhang Shengqi, also remained detained at
year's end, allegedly for supporting Liu.
A number of Catholic priests and lay leaders also were beaten or otherwise
abused during the year. For example, underground Catholic officials in Fujian
and Jiangxi provinces were harassed and detained in April and May. On June 16, a
priest in Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province, was detained while preparing to administer
sacraments to a dying Catholic. In Hebei Province, where approximately half of
the country's Catholics reside, friction between unofficial Catholics and local
authorities continued. Hebei authorities have forced many underground priests
and believers to choose between joining the Patriotic Church or facing fines,
job losses, periodic detentions, and, in some cases, the removal of their
children from school. Some Catholics have been forced into hiding. In July, five
underground clergy in Baoding, Hebei Province, reportedly were detained when
they attempted to visit a priest recently released from reeducation through
labor. Reliable sources also reported that Bishop An Shuxin, Bishop Zhang Weizhu,
Father Cui Xing, and Father Wang Quanjun remained detained in Hebei Province.
Underground Bishop Su Zhimin, who had been unaccounted for since his reported
detention in 1997, was reportedly hospitalized in November for treatment of eye
and heart ailments in Baoding, Hebei Province. Reports suggest that he had been
held in a form of "house arrest" until his illness required hospitalization.
Authorities sometimes used house arrest against religious leaders to avoid going
through the official security and justice systems. The Government continued to
deny any knowledge of Bishop Su's whereabouts or health condition and claimed
that it had not taken any "coercive measures" against him.
Authorities also have destroyed or seized unregistered places of worship. On
June 6, a church in Xiaoshan, Zhejiang Province, was torn down, although local
officials maintain the demolition occurred for zoning reasons. On September 10,
a church in Wenzhou, Zhejiang, was reportedly torn down because it was used to
hold illegal gatherings. Visitors to Xinjiang Autonomous Region also reported
that mosques have been destroyed, although some attributed the demolition as
much to inter-religious conflict between Hui and Uighur Muslims as to Government
antagonism. Leaders of the official Christian church reported mixed success in
regaining use of Church property confiscated by the Government shortly after the
1949 Communist revolution.
The Government continued to restore or rebuild some churches, temples,
mosques, and monasteries damaged or destroyed during the Cultural Revolution and
allowed the reopening of some seminaries during the year. The number of restored
and rebuilt temples, churches, and mosques remained inadequate to accommodate
the recent increase in religious believers. The difficulty in registering new
places of worship led to serious overcrowding in existing places of worship in
some areas. Some observers cited the lack of adequate meeting space in
registered churches to explain the rapid rise in attendance at house churches
and "underground" churches.
The law does not prohibit religious believers from holding public office;
however, most influential positions in government were reserved for Party
members, and Party officials stated that Party membership and religious belief
are incompatible. Party membership also was required for almost all high-level
positions in government and in state-owned businesses and organizations. The
Party reportedly issued circulars ordering Party members not to adhere to
religious beliefs. The Routine Service Regulations of the People's Liberation
Army state explicitly that servicemen "may not take part in religious or
superstitious activities." Party and PLA personnel have been expelled for
adhering to Falun Gong beliefs. In November, an international company that
employs over 100,000 women in the country reported that it had revised its
Chinese sales force agreement to remove an explicit ban on Falun Gong members.
Despite official regulations encouraging officials to be atheists, in some
localities as many as 25 percent of Party officials engaged in some kind of
religious activity. Most of these officials practiced Buddhism or a folk
religion. The National People's Congress (NPC) included several religious
representatives. Two of the NPC Standing Committee's vice chairmen are Fu
Tieshan, a bishop and vice-chairman of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic
Association, and Pagbalha Geleg Namgyai, a Tibetan "reincarnate lama." Religious
groups also were represented in the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference, an advisory forum for "multiparty" cooperation and consultation led
by the CCP, and in local and provincial governments. During the year, Director
of the State Administration for Religious Affairs Ye Xiaowen publicly emphasized
that the guiding "Three Represents" ideology includes serving the interests of
"the more than 100 million persons with religious beliefs." In a widely reported
July speech, he stated that "upholding the propaganda and education on atheism
and upholding the policy on freedom of religious belief are both correct and
necessary."
The authorities permitted officially sanctioned religious organizations to
maintain international contacts that did not involve "foreign control"; what
constitutes "control" was not defined. Regulations ban proselytizing by
foreigners. For the most part, authorities allowed foreign nationals to preach
to foreigners in approved, registered places of worship, bring in religious
materials for personal use, and preach to citizens at churches, mosques, and
temples at the invitation of registered religious organizations. Collective
religious activities of foreigners also were required to take place at
officially registered places of worship or approved temporary locations.
Foreigners legally were barred from conducting missionary activities, but many
foreign Christians teaching English and other subjects on college campuses
openly professed their faith with minimum interference from authorities.
Many Christian groups throughout the country have developed close ties with
local officials, in some cases running schools to help educate children who
otherwise would receive a substandard education and operating homes for the care
of the aged. Likewise, Buddhist-run private schools and orphanages in the
central part of the country not only educated children but also offered
vocational training courses to teenagers and young adults.
Official religious organizations administered local religious schools,
seminaries, and institutes to train priests, ministers, imams, Islamic scholars,
and Buddhist monks. Students who attended these institutes had to demonstrate
"political reliability," and all graduates must pass an examination on their
political as well as theological knowledge to qualify for the clergy. The
Government permitted limited numbers of Catholic and Protestant seminarians,
Muslim clerics, and Buddhist clergy to go abroad for additional religious
studies. In most cases, funding for these training programs was provided by
foreign organizations.
Both official and unofficial Christian churches had problems training
adequate numbers of clergy to meet the needs of their growing congregations. No
priests or other clergy in the official churches were ordained between 1955 and
1985, creating a severe shortfall in certain age groups. Due to government
prohibitions, unofficial churches had particularly significant problems training
clergy or sending students to study overseas, and many clergy received only
limited and inadequate preparation. Members of the underground Catholic Church,
particularly clergy wishing to further their studies abroad, found it difficult
to obtain passports and other necessary travel documents (see Section 2.d.).
Some Catholic clerics also complained that they were forced to bribe local RAB
officials before being allowed to enter seminaries.
Traditional folk religions, such as the "Mazu cult" in Fujian Province, which
is based on a legend, were still practiced in some locations. They were
tolerated to varying degrees, often seen as loose affiliates of Taoism or as
ethnic minority cultural practices. However, at the same time, folk religions
have been labeled as "feudal superstition" and sometimes were repressed because
their resurgence was seen as a threat to Party control. In recent years, local
authorities have destroyed thousands of shrines; however, there were no reports
of such destruction during the year.
Buddhists made up the largest body of organized religious believers. The
traditional practice of Buddhism continued to expand among citizens in many
parts of the country. Tibetan Buddhists in some areas outside of the TAR had
growing freedom to practice their faith. However, some Government restrictions
remained, particularly in cases in which the Government interpreted Buddhist
belief as supporting separatism, such as in some Tibetan areas and parts of the
Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. Visits by official emissaries of the Dalai
Lama and also by his brother, which occurred in July and September 2002,
continued when Lodi Gyari and Kelsang Gyaltsen, the Dalai Lama's representatives
to the United States and Europe, respectively, made a second trip to the country
in June. They met with officials and visited Shanghai, Beijing, and Tibetan
areas in Yunnan Province (see Tibet Addendum).
Regulations restricting Muslims' religious activity, teaching, and places of
worship continued to be implemented forcefully in Xinjiang. Authorities
reportedly continued to prohibit the teaching of Islam to children under the age
of 18 in areas where ethnic unrest has occurred and reserved the right to censor
imams' sermons, particularly during sensitive religious holidays. For example,
an independent imam in Kunming, Yunnan Province, was forced by the local
patriotic association to stop preaching after he began to draw large crowds.
Authorities believed his sermons were too fundamentalist in tone. In Xinjiang,
authorities also treated fundamentalist Muslim leaders particularly harshly. In
2000, the authorities began conducting monthly political study sessions for
religious personnel; the program reportedly continued during the year. The
authorities also continued in some areas to discourage overt religious attire
such as veils and to discourage religious marriage ceremonies. In addition, in
some areas, fasting reportedly was prohibited or made difficult during Ramadan.
There were numerous official media reports that the authorities confiscated
illegal religious publications in Xinjiang. The Xinjiang People's Publication
House was the only publisher allowed to print Muslim literature in Xinjiang, and
stores reported that those selling literature not included on Government lists
of permitted items risked closure.
In some areas where ethnic unrest has occurred, particularly among Central
Asian Muslims (and especially the Uighurs) in Xinjiang, officials continued to
restrict the building of mosques. However, in other areas, particularly in areas
traditionally populated by the non-Central Asian Hui ethnic group, there was
substantial religious building construction and renovation. Mosque destruction,
which sometimes occurred in Xinjiang, occasionally resulted from intra-religious
conflict.
The Government permitted Muslim citizens to make the Hajj to Mecca and in
some cases subsidized the journey. In 2002, approximately 2,000 persons were
permitted to make the Hajj with government-organized delegations, while up to an
additional 2,000 privately organized Hajjis went on their own after securing
government approval. Other Muslims made the trip to Mecca via third countries.
Uighur Muslims reportedly had greater difficulty getting permission to make the
Hajj than other Muslim groups, such as Hui Muslims. Factors limiting Chinese
Muslims' participation in the Hajj included costs and controls on passport
issuance.
There were no diplomatic relations between the Government and the Holy See,
although foreign Catholic officials visited during the year. While both
Government and Vatican authorities stated that they would welcome an agreement
to normalize relations, issues concerning the role of the Pope in selecting
bishops and the status of underground Catholic clerics have frustrated efforts
to reach this goal. Some bishops in the official Catholic Church were not openly
recognized by the Holy See, although many have been recognized privately.
Frequently, bishops were first consecrated and later sought Papal approval of
their consecrations, sometimes secretly, causing tensions between the Government
and the Vatican. Newly nominated bishops seeking unofficial Papal approval
frequently found themselves at odds with other church leaders, who were
sympathetic to the Central Government and who insisted that consecrations of new
bishops be conducted by more senior bishops not recognized by the Vatican.
Catholic priests in the official church also faced dilemmas when asked by
parishioners whether they should follow Church doctrine or government policy
restricting the number of children per family. This dilemma was particularly
acute when discussing abortion.
Government relations with the unofficial Catholic Church worsened somewhat.
After the July 1 demonstration in Hong Kong against legislation on Article 23 of
the Basic Law, the Government was stricter toward the underground Catholic
Church, in part because the Government accused Hong Kong Catholic leader Bishop
Joseph Zen of having a negative influence on his mainland coreligionists. The
Government's refusal to allow the official Catholic Church to recognize the
authority of the Papacy in matters such as the ordination of bishops led many
Catholics to refuse to join the official Catholic Church on the grounds that
this refusal denies one of the fundamental tenets of their faith.
There were no new reports of Nanjing Seminary professors or Protestant
preachers purged for theological perspectives different from those held by
Bishop Ding Guangxun, national leader of the official Protestant church. Foreign
teachers were officially invited to teach at both Catholic and Protestant
seminaries during the year.
The increase in the number of Christians resulted in a corresponding increase
in the demand for Bibles, which were available for purchase at most officially
recognized churches. Although the country had only one government-approved
publisher of Bibles and distribution had been a problem, the shortage of Bibles
in previous years appeared largely to have abated. Customs officials continued
to monitor for the "smuggling" of Bibles and other religious materials into the
country, but there were no new cases of significant punishments for Bible
importation. There were credible reports that the authorities sometimes
confiscated Bibles and other religious material in raids on house churches.
Weekly services of the foreign Jewish community in Beijing have been held
uninterrupted since 1995, and High Holy Day observances have been allowed for
more than 15 years. The Shanghai Jewish community was allowed to hold services
in an historic Shanghai synagogue, which has been restored as a museum. Local
authorities indicated that the community could use the synagogue in the future
for special occasions on a case-by-case basis.
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints meets regularly in a number
of cities, but its membership was strictly limited to the expatriate community.
Requests by expatriate Protestant churches for permission to allow local
Chinese to attend their services were rejected by the Government. Foreign
Protestant missionaries, including several in Guangzhou, were expelled during
the year. The Government claimed that those expelled had violated Chinese law.
Authorities singled out groups they considered to be "cults" for particularly
severe treatment. These "cults" included not only Falun Gong and various
traditional Chinese meditation and exercise groups (known collectively as
"qigong" groups), but also religious groups that authorities accused of
preaching beliefs outside the bounds of officially approved doctrine. For
example, police continued their efforts to close down an underground evangelical
group called the "Shouters," an offshoot of a pre-1949 indigenous Protestant
group. The Government continued a general crackdown on such groups, including
Eastern Lightning, the Association of Disciples, the Full Scope Church, the
Spirit Sect, the New Testament Church, the Way of the Goddess of Mercy, the Lord
God Sect, the Established King Church, the Unification Church, and the Family of
Love. Authorities accused some in these groups of lacking proper theological
training, preaching the imminent coming of the Apocalypse or holy war, or
exploiting the reemergence of religion for personal gain.
Actions against such groups continued during the year. For example, police in
January reportedly arrested over 100 members of the All-Scope Church in Henan
Province and accused them of being a "doomsday cult." In February 2002, three
members of the Blood and Water Holy Spirit Full Gospel Preaching Team were
sentenced to 7 years in prison for "using a cult organization to violate the
law" in Xiamen, Fujian Province. In December 2001, Gong Shengliang, founder of
the South China Church, was sentenced to death on criminal charges including
rape, arson, and assault. In 2002, an appeals court overturned his death
sentence, and Gong was sentenced to life in prison. In the retrial, four women
from his congregation claimed that, prior to the first trial, police had
tortured them into signing statements accusing Gong of raping them. The four
women, who were found not guilty of "cultist activity" in the retrial, were
nonetheless immediately sent to reeducation-through-labor camps. In the retrial,
the court also dropped all "evil cult" charges against the South China Church.
During the year, the Government continued its harsh and comprehensive
campaign against the Falun Gong. There were allegations that hundreds of
individuals received criminal, administrative, and extrajudicial punishment for
practicing Falun Gong, admitting that they believed in Falun Gong, or simply
refusing to denounce the organization or its founder. While the campaign against
Falun Gong appeared to have abated somewhat in eastern and southern China, it
continued in other provinces. During the SARS epidemic, the Government launched
new accusations that Falun Gong practitioners were disrupting SARS-prevention
efforts. State-run media claimed that, beginning in April, Falun Gong followers
"incited public panic" and otherwise "sabotaged" anti-SARS efforts in many
provinces by preaching that belief in Falun Gong will prevent persons from
contracting SARS. Authorities detained hundreds of Falun Gong adherents on such
charges, including 69 in Jiangsu Province during May and 180 in Hebei Province
during June.
Since the Government banned the Falun Gong in 1999, the mere belief in the
discipline (even without any public manifestation of its tenets) has been
sufficient grounds for practitioners to receive punishments ranging from loss of
employment to imprisonment. Although the vast majority of the tens of thousands
of practitioners detained since 2000 have been released, thousands reportedly
remained in reeducation-through-labor camps. Those identified by the Government
as "core leaders" have been singled out for particularly harsh treatment. More
than a dozen Falun Gong members have been sentenced to prison for the crime of
"endangering state security," but the great majority of Falun Gong members
convicted by the courts since 1999 have been sentenced to prison for "organizing
or using a sect to undermine the implementation of the law," a less serious
offense. Most practitioners, however, were punished administratively. In
addition to being sentenced to reeducation through labor, some Falun Gong
members were sent to detention facilities specifically established to
"rehabilitate" practitioners who refused to recant their belief voluntarily. In
addition, hundreds of Falun Gong practitioners have been confined to mental
hospitals (see Section 1.d).
Police often used excessive force when detaining peaceful Falun Gong
protesters, including some who were elderly or who were accompanied by small
children. During the year, there were further allegations of abuse of Falun Gong
practitioners by the police and other security personnel. Since 1997, at least
several hundred Falun Gong adherents reportedly have died while in police
custody (see Section 1.a.). In December, Liu Chengjun, sentenced to 19 years in
prison in March 2002 for involvement in illegal Falun Gong television
broadcasts, was reportedly beaten to death by police in Jilin City Prison. In
February 2002, Chengdu University Associate Professor Zhang Chuansheng died in
prison after being arrested for his involvement with Falun Gong. Prison
authorities claimed he died of a heart attack, but witnesses who saw his body
claimed he had been severely beaten.
Falun Gong practitioners continued their efforts to overcome government
attempts to restrict their right to free assembly, particularly in Beijing, but
the extent of Falun Gong public activity in the country continued to decline
considerably (see Section 2.b.). The Government initiated a comprehensive effort
to round up practitioners not already in custody and sanctioned the use of
high-pressure tactics and mandatory anti-Falun Gong study sessions to force
practitioners to renounce Falun Gong. Even practitioners who had not protested
or made other public demonstrations of belief reportedly were forced to attend
anti-Falun Gong classes or were sent directly to reeducation-through-labor
camps, where in some cases, beatings and torture reportedly were used to force
them to recant. These tactics reportedly resulted in large numbers of
practitioners signing pledges to renounce the movement.
Authorities also detained foreign Falun Gong practitioners. For example, in
January, two Australian citizens were deported for engaging in Falun Gong
activities in Sichuan Province. In November 2001, more than 30 foreigners and
citizens resident abroad were detained in Beijing as they demonstrated in
support of the Falun Gong. They were expelled from the country; some credibly
reported being mistreated while in custody.
During the year, the authorities also continued a general crackdown on other
groups considered to be "cults," often using the 1999 decision to ban cults
under Article 300 of the Criminal Law. Regulations require all qigong groups to
register with the Government. Those that did not were declared illegal. The
Zhong Gong qigong group, which reportedly had a following rivaling that of Falun
Gong, was banned in 2000. This created an atmosphere of uncertainty for many
qigong practitioners, and there were reports that some qigong practitioners
feared practicing or teaching openly. In February 2001, Zhang Xinying, vice
chairman of the Chinese Society of Religious Studies, said that the rise of
"cults" was due to frequent abuse of the concept of "religious freedom" by "some
persons with ulterior motives." Other senior leaders made similar comments in
the context of criticizing Falun Gong.
The Government taught atheism in schools. While the Government claimed that
there were no national-level regulations barring children from receiving
religious instruction, in some regions local authorities barred persons under 18
from attending services at mosques, temples, or churches.
For a more detailed discussion, see the
2003 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration and
Repatriation
Although the Government maintained restrictions on the freedom to change
one's workplace or residence, the national household registration and
identification card system continued to erode, and the ability of most citizens
to move within the country to work and live continued to expand. However, the
Government retained the ability to restrict freedom of movement through other
mechanisms. Authorities heightened restrictions periodically during the year,
particularly before politically sensitive anniversaries and to forestall
demonstrations.
The Government's "hukou" system of national household registration underwent
some liberalization during the year, as the country responded to economic
demands for a more mobile labor force. Nonetheless, many Chinese could not
officially change their residence or workplace within the country. Government
and work unit permission were often required before moving from city to city. It
was particularly difficult for peasants from rural areas to obtain household
registration in economically more developed urban areas. This produced a
"floating population" of between 100 and 150 million economic migrants who
lacked official residence status in cities. Without official residence status,
it was difficult or impossible to gain full access to social services, including
education. Further, migrant workers were generally limited to types of work
considered least desirable by local residents, and they had little recourse when
subject to abuse by employers and officials. In some major cities, access to
education for children of migrant workers continued to improve during the year,
and some cities began to offer migrants some other social services free of
charge. In September, Jiangsu Province became the first province to abolish the
distinction between urban and rural residents in its household registration
documents. In July, the city of Chengdu further liberalized its registration
system, allowing up to half of the city's 1.5 million migrants to qualify for
temporary residence permits. In June, the administrative detention system of
custody and repatriation applied to migrants was abolished (see Section 1.d.).
Authorities announced that custody and repatriation centers would be replaced by
a network of aid shelters offering services to migrants, but it was unclear at
year's end how these reforms would be implemented.
Prior to sensitive anniversaries, authorities in urban areas rounded up and
detained some "undesirables," including the homeless, the unemployed, migrant
workers, those without proper residence or work permits, petty criminals,
prostitutes, and the mentally ill or disabled. Dissidents reported that the
authorities restricted their freedom of movement during politically sensitive
periods and while foreign dignitaries visited the country.
Under the "staying at prison employment" system applicable to recidivists
incarcerated in reeducation-through-labor camps, authorities have denied certain
persons permission to return to their homes after serving their sentences. Those
persons sentenced to a total of more than 5 years in reeducation-through-labor
camps on separate occasions also could lose their legal right to return to their
home area. For those assigned to camps far from their residences, this practice
constituted a form of internal exile. The number of prisoners subject to this
restriction was unknown. Authorities reportedly forced other recently released
prisoners to accept jobs in state enterprises where they could be closely
monitored. Other released or paroled prisoners returned home but were not
permitted freedom of movement. Former senior leaders Zhao Ziyang and Bao Tong
remained under house arrest in Beijing, and security around them routinely was
tightened during sensitive periods.
The Government permitted legal emigration and foreign travel for most
citizens. Passports were increasingly easy to obtain in most places, although
those whom the Government deemed to be threats, including religious leaders,
political dissidents, and some ethnic minority members continued to have
difficulty obtaining passports (see Tibet Addendum). During the year, the
Government expanded from 25 to 100 the number of cities in which residents can
apply for a passport. Many local governments abolished regulations requiring
residents to obtain written permission from police and employers before applying
for a passport. The Government continued to use political attitudes as criteria
for selecting persons for government-sponsored study abroad; however, the
Government did not control privately sponsored students, who constituted the
majority of citizens studying abroad. Business travelers who wished to go abroad
could obtain passports relatively easily.
There were reports that some academics faced travel restrictions around the
year's sensitive anniversaries, particularly the June 4 anniversary of the 1989
Tiananmen Square massacre, and there were instances in which the authorities
refused to issue passports or visas on apparent political grounds. Members of
the underground Catholic Church, particularly clergy wishing to further their
studies abroad, found it difficult to obtain passports and other necessary
travel documents. Some Falun Gong members also reportedly had difficulty in
obtaining passports during the year. In May 2001, the Government prevented Dr.
Gao Yaojie, who had exposed the transmission of HIV through blood collection in
villages in Henan Province, from traveling abroad to receive an award.
Similarly, visas to enter the country also were denied. For example, some
foreign academics who had been critical of the country continued to be denied
visas.
Although a signatory of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the country has no law or regulations that
authorize the authorities to grant refugee status. The Government cooperated
with the UNHCR when dealing with the resettlement of ethnic Han Chinese or
ethnic minorities from Vietnam and Laos resident in the country. Since the late
1980s, the Government has adopted a de facto policy of tolerance toward the
small number of persons, fewer than 100 annually, from other nations who
registered with the Beijing office of the UNHCR as asylum seekers. The
Government permitted these persons to remain in the country while the UNHCR made
determinations as to their status and, if the UNHCR determined that they were
bona fide refugees, while they awaited resettlement in third countries. However,
the Government continued to deny the UNHCR permission to operate along its
northeastern border with North Korea, arguing that North Koreans who crossed the
border were illegal economic migrants, not refugees.
During the year, several thousand North Koreans were reportedly seized,
detained, and forcibly returned to their homeland, where many faced persecution.
In recent years, crackdowns on prostitution and forced marriages have resulted
in increased deportations of North Korean women. During the year, the Government
did permit approximately 300 North Koreans to travel to Seoul after they had
entered diplomatic compounds or international schools in China, and hundreds
more arrived in South Korea via third countries such as Mongolia, Vietnam,
Thailand, and Cambodia after transiting through China. There were numerous
credible reports of harassment, detention, and abuse of North Koreans in the
country, including the July 27 detention of four persons at the Beijing train
station and the August 7 detention of eight persons in Shanghai who allegedly
attempted to enter the Japanese school. The Government also arrested and
detained foreign journalists, missionaries and activists, as well as some
Chinese citizens, for providing food, shelter, transportation, and other
assistance to North Koreans. For example, South Korean photojournalist Seok Jae
Hyun was imprisoned in January while photographing North Korean refugees trying
to board boats headed for South Korea and Japan (see Section 2.a.). In August,
two South Korean journalists were detained and later expelled for allegedly
assisting North Koreans attempting to enter an international school in order to
transit to South Korea. In December, an employee of a Japanese NGO was detained
for trying to assist North Koreans in China.
While UNHCR reported that more than 2,000 Tibetans each year continued to
cross into Nepal, the Government continued to try to prevent many Tibetans from
leaving. In a case that raised serious international concerns, on May 31, the
Government pressured Nepalese authorities to repatriate forcibly 18 Tibetans,
including several minors. The 18 were denied access to the UNHCR, forced onto a
bus and taken back across the border to China, where they were held, first at a
border post and later at a prison in Shigatse. According to NGO reports, the
detainees were tortured, and most also were pressured for bribes. At year's end,
NGOs could not confirm that all 18 individuals had been released (see Tibet
Addendum).
In October, the Government executed Uighur Shaheer Ali after he and another
Uighur were forcibly returned to China in 2002 from Nepal, where they had been
granted refugee status by UNHCR (see Section 5).
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their
Government
Citizens lack the right to change their government peacefully and cannot
freely choose or change the laws and officials that govern them. Rural citizens
voted directly for their local village committees, which were not considered to
be government bodies, and, in some areas, for Party-reviewed candidates for
positions in township governments and county-level people's congresses. However,
people's congress delegates at the provincial level were selected by
county-level people's congresses, and, in turn, provincial-level people's
congresses selected delegates to the NPC. Although the Party vets candidates for
all elections above the village level, many township, county, and provincial
elections featured competition, with more candidates than available seats in
some races. Many elections, however, remained tightly controlled.
According to the Constitution, the NPC is the highest organ of state power.
Formally, it elects the President and Vice President, selects the Premier and
Vice Premiers, and elects the Chairman of the State Central Military Commission.
In practice, the NPC Standing Committee oversees these elections and determines
the agenda and procedure for the NPC under the direct authority of the CCP's
Politburo Standing Committee. The NPC does not have the power to set policy or
remove Government or Party leaders. In general, the election and agenda of
people's congresses at all levels remained under the firm control of the CCP,
the paramount source of political authority. By year's end, 23 provincial Party
leaders had been named to head concurrently provincial people's congresses in
order to strengthen Party control over the legislatures.
The CCP retained a tight rein on political decision-making and forbade the
creation of new political parties. The Government continued efforts to suppress
the CDP, an opposition party that had attracted hundreds of members nationwide
within a few months of its founding in 1998. Public security forces had
previously arrested nearly all of the CDP's leaders: Xu Wenli, Wang Youcai, and
Qin Yongmin were sentenced in 1998 to prison terms of 13, 12, and 11 years
respectively. Xu Wenli was released on medical parole to the United States in
December 2002, but Wang and Qin remained in prison. At the time of the 16th
Party Congress in November 2002, authorities targeted many remaining activists
for signing an open letter calling for political reform and a reappraisal of the
official verdict on the 1989 Tiananmen massacre (see Section 1.d.).
Under the Organic Law of the Village Committees, all of the country's
approximately 1 million villages were expected to hold competitive, direct
elections for subgovernmental village committees. A 1998 revision to the law
called for improvements in the nominating process and improved transparency in
village committee administration. The revised law also explicitly transferred
the power to nominate candidates to the villagers themselves, as opposed to
village groups or Party branches. According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs,
the majority of provinces have carried out at least four or five rounds of
village elections. Foreign observers who monitored local village committee
elections judged the elections they observed, on the whole, to have been fair.
However, the Government estimated that one-third of all elections had serious
procedural flaws. Corruption and interference by township level officials
continued to be a problem in some cases.
Since 1998, there has been experimentation at the township level designed to
expand the role of township residents in the selection of their leaders. The
country's Constitution forbids direct election of officials above the village
level, and a 2001 NPC directive emphasized that direct election of
township-level officials was forbidden. In August, Wei Shengduo, a Party
official in Chongqing municipality reportedly was detained for 2 weeks for
trying to organize a direct election for the head of township government.
Nonetheless, experimentation with indirect township-level elections continued
during the year, and results of such elections were allowed to stand. Most such
"elections" involved open nomination of candidates by township residents and pro
forma confirmation by the township people's congress, selected either directly
by residents or indirectly by "residents' representatives."
Candidates favored by local authorities have been defeated in some elections,
although, in general, the CCP dominated the local electoral process.
Approximately 60 percent of the members elected to the village committees were
Party members. National-level election procedures mandate secret ballots and
require villagers to be given ballots with space for write-in candidates, and
these requirements were implemented in most cases. In elections for district
level people's congresses, independent candidates were elected in Guangdong
Province in May and in Beijing in December.
During the year, the Government also experimented with other forms of public
oversight of government, including telephone hotline and complaint centers,
administrative hearings, increased opportunity for citizen observation of
government proceedings, and other forms of citizen input in the local
legislative process, such as hearings to discuss draft legislation, which have
been introduced on a limited basis in some areas.
Corruption remained an endemic problem. The courts and Party agencies took
disciplinary action against some public and Party officials during the year.
According to the Supreme People's Procuratorate, prosecutors at all levels
investigated 207,103 cases of embezzlement, bribery, and other functionary
crimes during the 1997-2002 period. During that period, 83,308 public officials
were convicted for graft or bribery, a 65 percent increase over the previous
5-year period, according to the Supreme People's Court. In April, the Minister
of Supervision reported that 860,000 corruption cases were filed against Party
members from 1997 to 2002, resulting in over 137,000 expulsions and disciplinary
action in over 98 percent of cases. The Party's Central Discipline and
Inspection Commission also played an important role in investigating corruption
and official malfeasance but published no statistics and, in some cases,
reportedly acted as a substitute for sanctions by the courts and other legal
agencies.
During the year, citizens seeking to petition the Central Government for
redress of grievances faced harassment, detention, and incarceration. In several
cases, Shanghai police officers and officials from the Shanghai Office of the
Bureau for Handling Letters and Visits traveled to Beijing to prevent Shanghai
residents from raising grievances with Central Government officials. On November
18, such a team of Shanghai officials detained Jiang Meili, the wife of
convicted Shanghai housing advocate Zheng Enchong, and her sister and forced
them to return to Shanghai. Jiang was in Beijing to consult her husband's
attorney. Other citizens expressing grievances involving housing and salary have
faced similar harassment. For example, Hong Kong resident Shen Ting was harassed
by non-Beijing police and detained in October for traveling to Beijing to
protest housing issues in Shanghai (see Section 1.f.). On December 2, Shanghai
residents Gong Haoming and Chen Enjuan were sentenced to 30 and 21 months'
reeducation through labor for "disturbing public order" after attempting to
petition Beijing authorities. Other activists also were reportedly sentenced to
reeducation through labor on the same charges.
The Government placed no special restrictions on the participation of women
or minority groups in the political process. However, women still held few
positions of significant influence at the highest rungs of the Party or
government structure. There was one woman on the 24-member Politburo; she
concurrently held the only ministerial post (out of 28) occupied by a woman.
There was also one woman among the five State Councilors. In the country's 28
ministries, only 14 women served at the level of vice minister or higher. Women
freely exercised their right to vote in village committee elections, but only a
small fraction of elected members were women. The Government and Party
organizations included approximately 12 million female officials out of 67
million Party members. Women constituted 20.2 percent of the NPC and 13.2
percent of the NPC Standing Committee. The 16th Party Congress in November 2002
elected 27 women to serve as members or alternates on the 198-person Central
Committee, a slight increase over the total of the previous committee.
Minorities constituted 14 percent of the NPC, although they made up
approximately 9 percent of the population. All of the country's 56 nationalities
were represented in the NPC membership. The 16th Party Congress elected 35
members of ethnic minorities to serve as members or alternates on the Central
Committee; however, minorities held few senior Party or government positions of
significant influence.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental
Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
The Government did not permit independent domestic NGOs to monitor openly or
to comment on human rights conditions. It was difficult to establish an NGO, and
the Government tended to be suspicious of independent organizations; most
existing NGOs were quasi-governmental in nature and were closely controlled by
government agencies (see Section 2.b.). However, an informal network of
dissidents in cities around the country has become a credible source of
information about government actions taken against activists. The information
was disseminated outside of the country through organizations such as the Hong
Kong-based Information Center for Human Rights and Democratic Movement in China
and the New York-based Human Rights in China.
The press regularly printed articles about officials who exceeded their
authority and infringed on citizens' rights. However, the Government remained
reluctant to accept criticism of its human rights record by other nations or
international organizations and criticized reports by international human rights
monitoring groups, claiming that such reports were inaccurate and interfered
with the country's internal affairs. Individuals, including Zheng Enchong of
Shanghai and Liu Fenggang of Beijing, were charged or convicted of "disclosing
state secrets" during the year after passing information to human rights NGOs
based abroad. The Government maintained that there are legitimate, differing
approaches to human rights based on each country's particular history, culture,
social situation, and level of economic development. The Government established
the China Society for Human Rights, a "nongovernmental" organization whose
mandate was not to monitor human rights conditions, but to defend the
Government's views and human rights record.
The Government had active human rights dialogues with many countries,
including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Norway,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as with the
European Union.
The Government continued its unofficial dialogue on human rights and prisoner
issues with a San Francisco-based human rights group. During the year,
officials accepted lists from this group of several hundred detainees and
provided detailed information on more than 100 cases. The group's executive
director traveled to Tibet, where he was granted access to a political prisoner
under house arrest, and visited Yancheng Prison in Hebei Province -- China's
first prison operated directly by the central government -- and Xiamen Prison in
Fujian Province.
In June, the Government submitted its first report on implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which the
Government has ratified. In September, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right
to Education visited, the first U.N. special rapporteur to visit the country
since 1994. In 2002, the Government agreed to invite the U.N. Special Rapporteur
on Torture, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, the U.N.
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, and the leaders of the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom to visit, but none of those visits took place.
In at least two cases, the Government attached conditions on visits which the
invited rapporteur or organization considered unacceptable.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or Social
Status
There were laws designed to protect women, children, persons with
disabilities, and minorities. However, in practice, some societal discrimination
based on ethnicity, gender, and disability persisted.
Discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS was widespread. According to
official statistics, over 1 million citizens were infected with HIV; U.N. and
other estimates suggested the true number could be twice as large.
Demonstrations by persons with HIV/AIDS protesting discrimination in treatment
or seeking greater access to health care sometimes attracted hundreds of
participants, particularly in central provinces where thousands of villagers
were infected at government-run blood collection centers. In some cases,
authorities arrested and used force against HIV/AIDS protesters (see Section
2.c.). Individuals who disseminated information about HIV/AIDS infection from
blood collection, including Henan provincial health official Ma Shiwen and Dr.
Gao Yaojie, sometimes faced harassment, detention, and lawsuits (see Sections
1.d. and 1.e.). The Government and many provinces did, however, amend marriage
laws during the year to permit marriages by those with HIV/AIDS. The first known
marriage between two HIV-positive persons since the law was amended took place
in July.
Women
Violence against women was a significant problem. There was no national law
criminalizing domestic violence, but Articles 43 and 45 of the Marriage Law
provide for mediation and administrative penalties in cases of domestic
violence. Over 30 provinces, cities or local jurisdictions have passed
legislation specifically to address domestic violence. While no reliable
statistics existed on the extent of physical violence against women, anecdotal
evidence suggested that reporting of domestic abuse was on the rise,
particularly in urban areas, because greater attention has been focused on the
problem. A July 2000 survey by the All-China Women's Federation found that
violence occurred in 30 percent of families, and 80 percent of cases involved
husbands abusing their wives. Actual figures were believed to be higher because
spousal abuse still went largely unreported. The survey found that domestic
violence occurred at all socioeconomic levels. According to experts, domestic
abuse was more common in rural areas than in urban centers. In response to
increased awareness of the problem of domestic violence, there were a growing
number of shelters for victims. Rape is illegal, and some persons convicted of
rape were executed. The law does not expressly recognize or exclude spousal
rape.
The Central Government prohibits the use of physical coercion to compel
persons to submit to abortion or sterilization. However, intense pressure to
meet birth limitation targets set by government regulations (see Section 1.f.)
has resulted in instances of local birth planning officials reportedly using
physical coercion to meet government goals. In addition, women faced a
disproportionate burden due to the government's enforcement of its birth
limitation laws and practices, which require the use of birth control methods
(particularly IUDs and female sterilization, which according to government
statistics accounted for over 80 percent of birth control methods employed) and
the abortion of certain pregnancies.
According to expert estimates, there were 1.7 to 5 million commercial sex
workers in the country. The increased commercialization of sex and related
trafficking in women trapped thousands of women in a cycle of crime and
exploitation and left them vulnerable to disease and abuse. According to the
official Xinhua News Agency, one in five massage parlors in the country was
involved in prostitution, with the percentage higher in cities. Unsafe working
conditions were rampant among the saunas, massage parlors, clubs, and hostess
bars that have sprung up in large cities. Research indicated that up to 80
percent of prostitutes in some areas had hepatitis. In light of this and, in
particular, of the growing threat of AIDS among sex workers, the U.N. Convention
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women Committee in 1998 recommended
that due attention be paid to health services for female prostitutes.
Although the Central Government and various provincial and local governments
have attempted to crack down on the sex trade, there have been numerous credible
reports in the media of complicity in prostitution by local officials. Actions
to crack down on this lucrative business, which involved organized crime groups
and businesspersons as well as the police and the military, had limited results.
However, there have been instances in which persons involved in organizing and
procuring prostitutes have been prosecuted. In December, state media reported
that a Guangdong Provincial Court sentenced a hotel official and "pimp" to life
in prison for procuring approximately 500 prostitutes for a September "orgy"
party for hundreds of Japanese tourists. Twelve other persons, including hotel
workers and travel agency employees, were sentenced to jail terms of between 2
and 15 years, but no local government officals or civil servants were convicted.
Trafficking in women and children and the kidnapping and sale of women and
children for purposes of prostitution or marriage were significant problems (see
Section 6.f.).
No statute outlaws sexual harassment in the workplace, and the law does not
specifically define sexual harassment. In March, Beijing courts accepted their
first sexual harassment case filed by a woman and, in September, awarded the
first sexual harassment judgment in favor of a man in another case. There was no
reliable data about the extent of sexual harassment, and the law did not
specifically define sexual harassment. Experts suggested that many victims of
sexual harassment did not report it out of fear of losing their jobs, but
awareness was growing. State media reported that a television series on sexual
harassment aired on many channels.
The Government has made gender equality a policy objective since 1949. The
Constitution states that "women enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of
life." The 1992 Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests provides
for equality in ownership of property, inheritance rights, and access to
education. Nonetheless, many activists and observers increasingly were concerned
that the progress that has been made by women over the past 50 years was being
eroded and that women's status in society had regressed during the 1990s. They
asserted that the Government appeared to have made the pursuit of gender
equality a secondary priority as it focused on economic reform and political
stability.
The Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests was designed to
assist in curbing gender-based discrimination. However, women continued to
report that discrimination, sexual harassment, unfair dismissal, demotion, and
wage discrepancies were significant problems. Efforts have been made by social
organizations as well as by the Government to educate women about their legal
rights, and there was anecdotal evidence that women increasingly were using laws
to protect their rights.
Nevertheless, women frequently encountered serious obstacles to the
enforcement of laws. According to legal experts, it was very hard to litigate a
sex discrimination suit because the vague legal definition made it difficult to
quantify damages. As a result, very few cases were brought to court. Some
observers also noted that the agencies tasked with protecting women's rights
tended to focus on maternity-related benefits and wrongful termination during
maternity leave rather than on sex discrimination, violence against women, and
sexual harassment. The structure of the social system also prevented women from
having a full range of options. Women who sought a divorce faced the prospect of
losing their housing since government work units allot housing to men when
couples marry.
The All China Women's Federation reported that 47 percent of laid-off workers
were women, a percentage significantly higher than their representation in the
labor force. Many employers preferred to hire men to avoid the expense of
maternity leave and childcare, and some even lowered the effective retirement
age for female workers to 40 years of age (the official retirement age for men
was 60 years and for women 55 years). Lower retirement ages also had the effect
of reducing pensions, which generally were based on years worked.
The law provides for equal pay for equal work. However, a 1999 Government
survey found that urban women were paid only 70.1 percent of what men received
for the same work, while women in rural areas received only 59.6 percent of male
peasants' incomes. Average incomes of female executives and senior professionals
were only 57.9 percent and 68.3 percent of their male colleagues' salaries.
Women have borne the brunt of the economic reform of state-owned enterprises.
Most women employed in industry worked in lower skilled and lower paid jobs and
in sectors, such as textiles, which were particularly vulnerable to
restructuring and layoffs.
A 1998 Asian Development Bank report estimated that 25 percent of all women
were semi-literate or illiterate, compared with 10 percent of men. Official
government statistics claimed that the illiteracy rate among women ages 15-40
was only 4.2 percent.
A high female suicide rate continued to be a serious problem. According to
the World Bank, Harvard University, and the World Health Organization, some 56
percent of the world's female suicides occur in China (approximately 500 per
day). The World Bank estimated the suicide rate in the country to be three times
the global average; among women, it was estimated to be nearly five times the
global average. Many observers believed that violence against women and girls,
discrimination in education and employment, the traditional preference for male
children, the country's birth limitation policies, and other societal factors
contributed to the especially high female suicide rate.
While the gap in the education levels of men and women was narrowing, men
continued to constitute a disproportionate number of the relatively small
percentage of the population that received a university-level education.
According to figures released by the All-China Women's Federation, in 2002 women
made up 44.0 percent of university students and 46.7 percent of all high school
students. However, women with advanced degrees reported an increase in
discrimination in the hiring process as the job distribution system opened up
and became more competitive and market driven. According to Government
statistics, 98.5 percent of girls nationwide were enrolled in elementary school,
but it was widely believed that the proportion of girls attending school in
rural areas was far smaller than in cities.
Children
The Constitution prohibits maltreatment of children and provides for
compulsory education. The country has outlawed child labor and trafficking in
children, but serious problems in those areas persisted.
The Constitution provides for 9 years of compulsory education for children,
but in economically disadvantaged rural areas, many children did not attend
school for the required period and some never attend. Public schools were not
allowed to charge tuition, but after the Central Government largely stopped
subsidizing primary education in the early 1990s, many public schools began to
charge mandatory fees to meet revenue shortfalls. Such fees made it difficult
for poorer families to send their children to school or to send them on a
regular basis. Some charitable schools have opened in recent years in rural
areas, but not enough to meet demand. Children of migrant workers in urban areas
also often had difficulty attending school. For these families, excessive school
fees were a significant problem. The Government campaign for universal primary
school enrollment by 2000 (which was not met) helped to increase enrollment in
some areas. It also reportedly led some school officials to inflate the number
of children actually enrolled.
In September, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education visited
the country. Following the visit, the Special Rapporteur reported that the
Government failed to provide education to many children of migrant workers and
prohibitted children from receiving religious education. The Special Rapporteur
expressed serious concern about the recent privatization of the costs of public
education, reporting that the Government compels parents to pay nearly half the
costs of public education, making education inaccessible to many children. The
Special Rapporteur also recommended the immediate prohibition of the practice of
children performing manual labor at their schools to raise funds.
An extensive health care delivery system has led to improved child health and
a continued decline in infant mortality rates. According to the 2000 Census, the
infant mortality rate was 28.4 per 1,000. According to UNICEF statistics, the
mortality rate for children under 5 years of age was 39 per 1,000 live births.
The Law on the Protection of Juveniles forbids infanticide; however, there was
evidence that the practice continued. According to the NPFPC, only a handful of
doctors have been charged with infanticide under this law. The law prohibits
discrimination against disabled minors and codifies a variety of judicial
protections for juvenile offenders. The physical abuse of children can be
grounds for criminal prosecution.
Despite government efforts to prevent kidnapping and the buying and selling
of children, these problems persisted in some rural areas (see Section 6.f.).
There were no reliable estimates of the number of children trafficked.
Domestically, most trafficked children were sold to couples unable to have
children; in particular, boys were trafficked to couples unable to have a son.
However, in March, 28 baby girls were found packed in suitcases on a bus in
Guangxi Province, apparently being shipped for sale elsewhere within the country
(see Section 6.f.). Children also were trafficked for labor purposes. Girls and
women were trafficked for prostitution and for sale as brides (see Section
6.f.).
Children reportedly were detained administratively, for minor crimes they
committed or because they were homeless. After the abolition of the system of
custody and repatriation (see Section 1.c.), the Government acknowledged that a
growing number of homeless "street children" lived in cities and survived by
begging. According to a credible report, children at times had accounted for as
many as 20 percent of those detained in the custody and repatriation centers.
Such children sometimes were detained without their parents, routinely were held
with adults, and sometimes were required to work (see Sections 1.d. and 6.c.).
In June, 3-year-old Li Shiyi starved to death at home in Chengdu, Sichuan, after
police detained her mother and reportedly ignored the mother's pleas to check on
the girl. The incident prompted a hunger strike by 200 intellectuals across the
country.
Female infanticide, sex-selective abortions, and the abandonment and neglect
of baby girls remained problems due to the traditional preference for sons and
the birth limitation policy. Many families, particularly in rural areas, used
ultrasound to identify female fetuses and terminate pregnancies. An official
study in Hainan found that 68 percent of abortions were of female fetuses.
Official figures from November 2000 put the overall male-female birth ratio at
116.9 to 100 (as compared to the statistical norm of 106 to 100). For second
births, the ratio was 151.9 to 100. Female babies also suffered from a higher
mortality rate than male babies, contrary to the worldwide trend. State media
reported that infant mortality rates in rural areas were 27 percent higher for
girls than boys. Neglect of baby girls was one factor in their lower survival
rate. One study found the differential mortality rates were highest in areas
where women had a lower social status and economic and medical conditions were
poor.
The Law on the Protection of Juveniles forbids the mistreatment or
abandonment of children. According to the latest available figures, compiled in
1994, the number of children abandoned annually was approximately 1.7 million,
and the number may have grown over the subsequent decade despite the fact that,
under the law, child abandonment is punishable by a fine and a 5-year prison
term. The vast majority of children in orphanages were female, although some
were males who were either disabled or in poor health. The treatment of children
at these institutions has improved, especially with the increased attention
created by foreign adoptions, but serious problems remained and mortality rates
in some institutions were high. Medical professionals frequently advised parents
of children with disabilities to put the children into orphanages. In recent
years, some private orphanages (not funded by the Government), in which
conditions may be generally better for children, have started to operate. In
areas where such orphanages existed, some state-run orphanages exhibited a
willingness to learn from them and to adopt some of their more modern practices,
including the use of foster care.
The Government denied that children in orphanages were mistreated or refused
medical care but acknowledged that the system often was unable to provide
adequately for some children, particularly those who were admitted with serious
medical problems. During the year, some orphanages were renovated, new
orphanages were constructed, and children in some areas received improved care.
A 1997 revision of the adoption law made it easier for couples to adopt.
Persons With Disabilities
The law protects the rights of the country's persons with disabilities;
however, reality for persons with disabilities lagged far behind legal dictates,
and many did not receive or have access to special assistance or to programs
designed to assist them. According to the official press, all local Governments
have drafted specific measures to implement the law.
As attention began to focus on the upcoming Special Olympics and Paralympics to
be held in the country in 2007-08, the press increasingly publicized the plight
of persons with disabilities and the Government's efforts to assist them. State
media reported that the Government spent over $12.5 million (RMB 103.75 million)
on infrastructure improvements for persons with disabilities during the year.
The Government, at times in conjunction with NGOs such as the Lions Club
International or the Special Olympics, sponsored a wide range of preventive and
rehabilitative programs. For example, several thousand blind persons have been
trained in therapeutic massage. The goal of many of these programs was to allow
persons with disabilities to be integrated into the rest of society. However,
misdiagnosis, inadequate medical care, pariah status, and abandonment remained
common problems.
According to reports, doctors frequently persuaded parents of children with
disabilities to place their children in large government-run institutions, often
far from the parents, and in which care was often seriously inadequate. Those
parents who chose to keep children with disabilities at home generally faced
difficulty in getting adequate medical care, day care, and education. Government
statistics showed that almost one-quarter of the approximately 60 million
persons with disabilities lived in extreme poverty. Unemployment among disabled
adults remained a serious problem. The Government's official strategy was to
integrate persons with disabilities into the mainstream work force, but efforts
to do so were limited and confronted a cultural legacy of discrimination and
neglect. Standards adopted for making roads and buildings accessible to persons
with disabilities were subject to the Law on the Handicapped, which calls for
their "gradual" implementation; compliance with the law was lax. Students with
disabilities were discriminated against in access to education. The Higher
Education Law permits universities legally to exclude disabled candidates for
higher education.
The Maternal and Child Health Care Law forbids the marriage of persons with
certain specified contagious diseases or certain acute mental illnesses such as
schizophrenia. If doctors find that a couple is at risk of transmitting
disabling congenital defects to their children, the couple may marry only if
they agree to use birth control or undergo sterilization. The Population and
Family Planning Law of 2002 requires local governments to employ such practices
to raise the percentage of healthy births.
Until the system of custody and repatriation was abolished in June, persons
in urban areas with mental illness or disability who were found on city streets
could be detained administratively. While the Government reported that it was
establishing a system of humanitarian aid shelters to replace the custody and
repatriation system, it was not clear if these shelters would provide effective
services to persons with disabilities or other populations (see Section 1.d.).
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
According to the 2000 census, the total population of the country's 55 ethnic
minorities was 106.4 million, or 8.4 percent of the total population. Most
minority groups resided in areas they traditionally have inhabited. The
Government's avowed policy on minorities calls for preferential treatment in
marriage regulations, birth planning, university admission, and employment.
Programs have been established to provide low-interest loans, subsidies, and
special development funds for minority areas. Nonetheless, in practice,
minorities faced discrimination by the majority Han culture. Most of the
minorities in border regions were less educated than the national average, and
job discrimination in favor of Han migrants remained a serious problem. Racial
discrimination was the source of deep resentment on the part of minorities in
some areas, such as Xinjiang and Tibetan areas. For example, ethnic Uighurs in
Xinjiang did not have equal access to newly created construction jobs associated
with development projects; Han workers were brought in from Sichuan and
elsewhere to work, particularly on technical projects such as oil and gas
pipelines. The Government did not openly recognize racism against minorities or
tension among different ethnic groups as problems.
Government development policies have long been in place to improve minority
living standards. However, while overall standards of living for those in
minority areas have improved as a result of these policies, real incomes in
minority areas, particularly for minorities, remained well below those in other
parts of the country. The majority Han Chinese have benefited disproportionately
from government programs and economic growth, even in minority areas. Many
development programs have disrupted traditional living patterns of minority
groups, and have included, in some cases, the forced evacuation of persons (see
Section 2.d.).
Since 1949, Government policy has resulted in a significant migration of Han
Chinese to Xinjiang. According to a Government White Paper released in May,
approximately 8.25 million of Xinjiang's 19.25 million official residents were
Han Chinese, up from 300,000 Han in 1949. Approximately 8 million Xinjiang
residents are Uighurs. Signficant numbers of Kazakhs, Hui, Tajiks, and other
minorities also live in Xinjiang. Official statistics underestimated the Han
population of Xinjiang because the Government did not count the thousands of Han
Chinese who were long-term "temporary workers" as part of the official
population. The migration of ethnic Han into Xinjiang in recent decades has
caused the Han-Uighur ratio in the capital of Urumqi to shift from 20:80 to
80:20 and was a source of Uighur resentment. Similarly, many non-Tibetan
residents of the TAR have lived there for years as "temporary" residents (see
Tibet Addendum).
In many areas with a significant population of minorities, there were
two-track school systems which used either standard Chinese or the local
minority language. Students could choose to attend schools in either system.
However, graduates of minority language schools typically needed 1 year or more
of intensive Chinese before they could handle course work at a Chinese-language
university. Despite the Government's efforts to provide schooling in minority
languages, the dominant position of standard Chinese in government, commerce,
and academia put graduates of minority schools who lacked standard Chinese
proficiency at a disadvantage. The vast majority of Uighur children in Xinjiang
attended Uighur-language schools and generally received an hour's Chinese
language instruction per day. Tuition at Chinese-language schools in Xinjiang
was generally more costly, and thus, most Uighur children living in rural areas
were unable to afford them.
The CCP has an avowed policy of boosting minority representation in the
Government and the CCP, and minorities constituted 14 percent of the NPC, which
was higher than their percentage in the population. A 1999 government white
paper reported that there were 2.7 million minority officials in the Government.
The May Government White Paper states that there are 348,000 minority cadres in
Xinjiang, accounting for 51.8 percent of all Party members in the autonomous
region. Many members of minorities occupied local leadership positions, and a
few held positions of influence in the local Party apparatus or at the national
level. For example, 63 percent of Xinjiang's deputies to the NPC are ethnic
minorities. However, in most areas, ethnic minorities were shut out of positions
of real political and economic power, which fed resentment of Han officials
holding the most powerful Party positions in minority autonomous regions.
Tensions between ethnic Han citizens and Uighurs in Xinjiang continued, and
the authorities continued to restrict political, civil, and religious freedoms
(see Section 2.c.) in the region. A campaign that began in 1997 to stress unity
and to condemn "splittism" and religious extremism showed no signs of abating.
During the year, authorities continued to prohibit activities deemed separatist
in nature, announced tightened security measures, and mounted campaigns to crack
down on opposition.
The strike hard campaign in Xinjiang specifically targeted the "three evils"
of extremism, splittism, and terrorism as the major threats to Xinjiang's social
stability. Because the Government authorities in Xinjiang regularly grouped
together those involved in "ethnic separatism, illegal religious activities, and
violent terrorism," it was often unclear whether particular raids, detentions,
or judicial punishments targeted those peacefully seeking their goals or those
engaged in violence. Many observers raised concerns that the Government's war on
terror was a justification for cracking down harshly on Uighurs expressing
peaceful political dissent and on independent Muslim religious leaders. On
December 15, the Government published an "East Turkestan Terrorist List," which
labelled organizations such as the World Uighur Youth Congress and the East
Turkestan Information Center as terrorist entities. These groups openly advocate
for East Turkestan independence, but have not been publicly linked to violent
activity.
Uighurs were executed and sentenced to long prison terms during the year on
charges of separatism. According to official accounts, by May 2001, the
authorities had prosecuted more than 3,000 cases and massive public sentencing
rallies attended by more than 300,000 persons had been held throughout the
region. In October, Uighur Shaheer Ali was executed after being convicted of
terrorism in 2002 and sentenced to death in March. In 2002, Ali and another
Uighur were repatriated forcibly to the country from Nepal, where they had been
granted refugee status by the UNHCR.
For many Uighurs, the ongoing imprisonment of Uighur businesswoman Rebiya
Kadeer symbolized the Government's mistreatment of Uighurs. In March 2000, a
Xinjiang court sentenced Kadeer, a former member of the provincial-level Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference, to 8 years in prison on charges of
"passing state intelligence" to foreigners; according to an official press
report, the intelligence she was accused of passing included newspaper articles
and a list of names of persons whose cases had been handled by the courts.
Kadeer, her son, and her secretary were arrested in 1999 while on their way to
meet a visiting foreign delegation. Kadeer reportedly suffered various health
problems in prison. Some foreign observers believed Kadeer was singled out for
her activism on behalf of Uighurs and for her husband's involvement with Uighur
causes and Radio Free Asia. In December 2002, some of Kadeer's family members
were briefly detained and questioned during a visit of senior foreign officials.
Other Uighurs whose work emphasized pride in cultural identity have also been
harassed and detained by the Government. In late 2001, the U.N. Human Rights
Committee ruled that Uighur scholar Tohti Tunyaz had been arbitrarily detained.
He was sentenced in 1999 to an 11-year term for "inciting separatism" and
"illegally acquiring state secrets" after he returned to Xinjiang in connection
with his research studies on ethnic minorities at the University of Tokyo.
Possession of separatist publications or audiovisual materials was not
permitted, and, according to reports, possession of such materials resulted in
lengthy prison sentences. The author of a history of the Uighurs that was
severely criticized by provincial-level and national authorities in the
mid-1990s remained prohibited from publishing or from meeting with foreigners. A
Uighur-language press existed in Xinjiang, but it had a very small circulation.
During the year, regulations requiring Uighurs to use Mandarin Chinese
characters for their names on identification documents were reportedly
strengthened.
Han control of the region's political and economic institutions also
contributed to heightened tension. Although government policies brought tangible
economic improvements to Xinjiang, Han residents have received a
disproportionate share of the benefits. The majority of Uighurs were poor
farmers, and 25 percent were illiterate.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of association. However, in practice,
workers were not free to organize or join unions of their own choosing. The
All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), which was controlled by the
Communist Party and headed by a high-level Party official, was the sole legal
workers' organization. The Trade Union Law gives the ACFTU control over the
establishment and operation of all subsidiary union organizations and activities
throughout the country, including enterprise-level unions. The Trade Union Law
also allows workers to decide whether to join official unions in their
enterprises. There were no reports of repercussions for the small percentage of
workers in the state-owned sector that had not joined. Independent unions are
illegal.
Although the ACFTU and its constituent unions had a monopoly on trade union
activity, their influence over the workplace diminished with the economic
reforms of recent years. ACFTU unions were relatively powerless to protect the
tens of millions of members who have lost their jobs or had their wages or
benefits delayed or cut in the massive restructuring of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs). The unions have, however, provided some benefits and reemployment
assistance to affected workers. The ACFTU had difficulty organizing in the
country's rapidly growing private and foreign-invested sectors, where union
membership during the year was estimated to be less than 20 percent. With
declines in the state-owned sector and organizational weakness outside the state
sector, the ACFTU's membership declined from nearly 100 percent of the urban
workforce during the height of the planned economy to approximately 50 percent
in recent years. The ACFTU reported a membership of 130 million at the end of
2002, out of an estimated 248 million urban workers.
The existence of an enormous rural labor force, some 490 million out of a
total labor force of approximately 750 million, also complicated the
organization and protection of workers. Farmers did not have a union or any
other similar organization. Of some 130 million rural residents working in
township and village enterprises, only a very small percentage were represented
by unions. A "floating" migrant labor force of over 100 to 150 million persons
has proven especially difficult to organize and protect, although state-run
media reported in August that the ACFTU has stepped up a campaign to bring
migrant workers into the union. Some of these migrants gravitated to temporary
or seasonal low-wage work in urban areas where their residence, under the
country's registration system, often was illegal (see Section 2.d.). Many
migrants, including substantial numbers of young women, were attracted to the
growing private sector where unions were few and where their desire to earn more
than they could in rural areas made them easy to exploit.
The ACFTU has shown some interest in adapting its style to the needs of labor
in a market economy. Local ACFTU federations have allowed, even facilitated, a
few limited experiments in more open union elections and decision-making. These
included freely electing, by secret ballot, the leadership of ACFTU-affiliated
unions at several foreign-owned factories in Guangdong and Fujian Provinces in
2002 and 2003. The ACFTU also actively pushed amendments to the Trade Union Law,
passed in 2001, that give greater protection to union organizing efforts and
legitimize union activity in the private sector, including foreign-invested
enterprises, and will now allow migrant workers to become union members. Despite
the ACFTU's stated goals to organize these new groups of workers, there had been
very limited gains as of year's end.
During the year, the Government took specific actions against illegal union
activity, including the detention and arrest of labor activists. In May, Yao
Fuxin and Xiao Yunliang, leaders of a large labor protest in Liaoyang City,
Liaoning Province, who were detained in March 2002, were sentenced to 7 and 4
years in prison, respectively, based largely on allegations that they had made
contact with the CDP in 1998, several years before the workers protests. Many
observers believed that the sentences were largely in retaliation for their role
in the labor protests.
Other labor activists, detained in previous years, were reportedly still in
detention at year's end. Hu Mingjun was serving an 11-year sentence and Wang Sen
a 10-year sentence for supporting December 2000 worker protests in Sichuan
Province. Shanghai labor dissident Wang Miaogen, detained in 1996, was still
being held in a psychiatric hospital. Other labor activists reportedly still in
detention included Zhang Shanguang, Li Wangyang, Li Jiaqing, Miao Jinhong, Ni
Xiafei, Li Keyou, Liao Shihua, Yue Tianxiang, Guo Xinmin, He Zhaohui, Liu
Jingsheng, Peng Shi, Wang Guoqi, and labor lawyer Xu Jian. However, in June, the
Government reportedly released Di Tiangui after he served a 1-year sentence for
trying to organize a national federation of retired workers.
The country was a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and
had ratified core ILO conventions prohibiting child labor, including the worst
forms of child labor and discrimination in remuneration for male and female
workers. At year's end, the Government had not ratified other core conventions
regarding the right of association, the right to collective bargaining, and the
prohibition against compulsory labor.
At year's end, the Government had not replied to an ILO request for further
information in connection with a 1998 complaint brought to the ILO by the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) alleging the detention
of trade unionists and violations of the right to organize. In 2002, the ICFTU
submitted another complaint to the ILO alleging repression of independent
workers' protests in Liaoyang in Liaoning Province and Daqing in Heliongjiang
Province calling attention to the sentencing of two worker activists in Sichuan
Province.
The ACFTU had active ties with other national trade union organizations and
had a cooperative relationship with the ILO's China office. In 2002, the ACFTU
gained a deputy workers' member seat on the ILO's Governing Body, a seat it lost
in 1990 during the crackdown following the Tiananmen Square massacre. The ICFTU
publicly condemned China for its denial of the right of free association, in
particular for arresting labor activists. The ACFTU cooperated with the U.N.
Development Program on a program, part of which was designed to assist unions to
adapt to a new labor relations model.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Labor Law permits collective bargaining for workers in all types of
enterprises; however, in practice, genuine collective bargaining still did not
occur. Under the law, collective contracts are to be developed through
collaboration between the labor union (or worker representatives in the absence
of a union) and management, and should specify such matters as working
conditions, wage scales, and hours of work. The law also permits workers and
employers in all types of enterprises to sign individual contracts, which are to
be drawn up in accordance with the collective contract.
The country's shift toward a market economy and changing labor-management
relations created pressures for collective bargaining that would include more
genuine negotiations and take workers' interests into greater account. The Trade
Union Law specifically addresses unions' responsibility to bargain collectively
on behalf of workers' interests. However, given the non-democratic,
Party-dominated nature of unions, collective bargaining fell far short of
international standards. Workers had no means to formally approve or reject the
outcome of collective contract negotiations and, without the right to strike,
only a limited capacity to influence the negotiation process.
In the private sector, where official unions were few and alternative union
organizations were unavailable, workers faced substantial obstacles to
bargaining collectively with management. Workplace-based worker committees,
expected to guide union activities and serve as the vehicle for worker input
into enterprise policies, were common. However, in SOEs, many were little more
than rubber stamps for deals predetermined by enterprise management, the union,
and the CCP representative.
The Trade Union Law provides specific legal remedies against anti-union
discrimination and specifies that union representatives may not be transferred
or terminated by enterprise management during their term of office. These
provisions were aimed primarily at the private sector, where resistance to
unions was common. The degree to which these provisions were enforced was
unknown. Anti-union activity was virtually unknown in the state-owned sector.
Neither the Constitution nor the law provides for the right to strike. The
Trade Union Law acknowledges that strikes may occur, in which case the union is
to reflect the views and demands of workers in seeking a resolution of the
strike. Some observers have interpreted this provision to offer at least a
theoretical legal basis for the right to strike. However, government treatment
of worker protests as illegal demonstrations established that there was still no
officially accepted right to strike. In addition, no other types of planned
worker action were allowed.
During the year, the profound economic and social changes affecting workers
continued to produce labor-related disputes and worker actions. These included
spontaneous and on-the-job protests, most of them directed against SOEs, usually
over actual and feared job losses, wage or benefit arrears, or allegations of
owner/management corruption in enterprise restructuring. The Government took
swift action to halt protests. Police detained protest leaders and dispersed
demonstrations, usually with minimum force. They sometimes subsequently offered
payments that met at least a portion of protestors' demands. The most noteworthy
labor protests in recent years occurred in the spring of 2002 in the
northeastern region of the country, particularly in Liaoyang, Liaoning Province.
In the Liaoyang protests, thousands of organized workers and sympathizers
demonstrated for a number of days, protesting alleged corruption in the closure
of a major local SOE, the loss of jobs, and wage and benefit irregularities. As
a consequence of the protests, four worker leaders were arrested. Of these, Yao
Fuxin and Xiao Yunliang were convicted on subversion charges and sentenced in
May (see Section 6.a.). After the protests, the former manager of the SOE was
sentenced to 13 years on smuggling charges. The local Government fired
Liaoyang's police chief and demoted a top Party official in the city. Work
stoppages at private companies were far fewer than in SOEs but did occasionally
occur.
The Labor Law provides for mediation, arbitration, and court resolution of
labor disputes. Under these procedures, cases are to be dealt with first in the
workplace, through a mediation committee, then, if unresolved, through a local
arbitration committee under government sponsorship. If no solution is reached at
this level, the dispute may be submitted to the courts. According to Ministry of
Labor and Social Security statistics for 2002, 51,000 labor disputes were
settled through mediation, and 184,000 disputes involving 610,000 workers were
submitted to arbitration, increases of about 19 percent and 31 percent,
respectively, over 2001 figures. Of these cases, 11,000 were collective labor
disputes, and a vast majority of cases, 179,000 or 91 percent, were resolved.
Observers differed over the effectiveness of these dispute resolution
procedures. Workers reportedly had little trust in the fairness of workplace
mediation. They viewed unions, which played a major mediation role, as inclined
to favor management. Workers favored arbitration over workplace mediation,
although they often looked with suspicion on the local government role in the
process.
Laws governing working conditions in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were not
significantly different from those in effect in the rest of the country. Lax
enforcement of these laws by provincial and local officials was a serious
problem in the SEZs, as in other parts of the country. Wages in the SEZs and in
the southeastern part of the country generally were higher for some categories
of workers than in other parts of the country because high levels of investment
have created a great demand for available labor. As in other areas of the
country, officials acknowledged that some investors in the SEZs were able to
negotiate "sweetheart" deals with local partners that bypassed labor regulations
requiring the provision of benefits and overtime compensation. Some foreign
businesses in the SEZs had ACFTU-affiliated unions, and management reported
positive relations with union representatives, in part because the ACFTU
discouraged strikes and work stoppages.
c. Prohibition on Forced or Bonded Labor
The law prohibits forced and bonded labor, and the Government denied that
forced or bonded labor was a problem; however, forced labor was a serious
problem in penal institutions. Citizens were consigned to penal labor
institutions, without judicial process (see Section 1), that by law and public
policy utilized labor as a means of reform and reeducation. Detainees in custody
and repatriation centers, before that system was abolished in June, as well as
reeducation-through-labor detainees and prisoners and pretrial detainees in the
regular prison system, were required to work, often with little or no
remuneration. Diplomatic observers generally were unable to gain access to
reform institutions to evaluate allegations about the treatment of prisoners. In
some cases, prisoners worked in facilities directly connected with penal
institutions; in other cases, they were contracted to nonprison enterprises.
Facilities and their management profited from inmate labor.
In 1992, the U.S. and Chinese Governments signed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU), followed by an implementing statement of cooperation (SOC)
in 1994. These agreements expressed the intention of the governments to
cooperate to assure that Chinese prison-made products were not exported to the
United States. However, Chinese cooperation under the MOU and SOC has been poor.
Regular working-level meetings were held in 2002, but a scheduled prison visit
and further cooperation were suspended in 2003 due to SARS; no prison visits
took place during the year. Although monthly meetings resumed in December 2003,
the backlog of cases remained substantial at year's end. The Government
continued to exclude explicitly reform- and reeducation-through-labor
institutions from the agreements.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, but some child
trafficking victims were reportedly sold into forced labor (see Section 6.f.).
Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment
The law prohibits the employment of children under the age of 16, but the
Government had not adopted a comprehensive policy to combat child labor. The
Labor Law specifies administrative review, fines, and revocation of business
licenses of those businesses that illegally hire minors. The law also stipulates
that parents or guardians should provide for children's subsistence. Workers
between the ages of 16 and 18 were referred to as "juvenile workers" and were
prohibited from engaging in certain forms of physical work, including labor in
mines.
The Government continued to maintain that the country did not have a
widespread child labor problem and that the majority of children who worked did
so at the behest of their families, particularly in impoverished rural areas, to
supplement family income. Child workers in rural areas appeared to work
primarily for township and village enterprises and in agriculture. In urban
areas, they often worked as menial and street laborers. Some observers believed
that coalmines, which often operated far from urban centers and out of the
purview of law enforcement officials, also occasionally employed children. The
Government argued that the existence of a large adult migrant labor force, often
willing to work long hours for low wages, reduced the attractiveness of child
labor for employers.
Some students worked in light industrial production within or for their
schools. In March 2001, an explosion in Jiangxi Province at an elementary school
that was also used to manufacture fireworks killed 42 persons, most of them
schoolchildren who worked to assemble the fireworks. After parents of the
children spoke to the press, the Government took disciplinary action against
local officials who had attempted to cover-up the case as an attack by a "mad
bomber." Provincial officials moved to tighten controls over Jiangxi's
economically important fireworks industry. This incident may have served as a
catalyst for greater government acknowledgement of the problem of child labor.
In the autumn of 2001, the Government announced the formation of a multi-agency
commission to study the issue. The commission failed to produce a public report.
In October 2002, the State Council issued a regulation clarifying existing child
labor prohibitions.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Labor Law provides for broad legal protections for workers on such
matters as working hours, wages, and safety and health. The Trade Union Law
invests unions with the authority to protect workers against violations of their
legal rights or contractually agreed conditions of work. The Law on the
Prevention and Treatment of Occupational Diseases, and the Production Safety Law
identify responsibilities for work-related illness and accidents, and provide
for specific penalties for violation of the law. However, there remained a
substantial gap between the law's formal provisions for work conditions and the
actual situation in the workplace.
There was no national minimum wage. The Labor Law allows local governments to
determine their own standards for minimum wages. Local governments generally set
their minimum wage at a level higher than the local minimum living standard but
lower than the average wage. Widespread official corruption and efforts by local
officials to attract and keep taxpaying, job-producing enterprises that might
otherwise locate elsewhere undercut enforcement of the minimum wage provisions.
The Labor Law mandates a 40-hour standard workweek, excluding overtime, and a
24-hour weekly rest period. It also prohibits overtime work in excess of 3 hours
per day or 36 hours per month and mandates a required percentage of additional
pay for overtime work. However, these standards were regularly violated,
particularly in the private sector. They were particularly ignored in
enterprises that could rely on a vast supply of low-skilled migrant labor. In
many industries such as textile and garment manufacturing, compulsory overtime
reportedly was common, often without overtime pay. During the year, auditors
found that some factories routinely falsified overtime and payroll records.
There also were reports of workers being prevented from leaving factory
compounds without permission.
Occupational health and safety concerns remained serious. The poor
enforcement of occupational health and safety laws and regulations continued to
put workers' lives at risk. The State Administration for Work Safety (SAWS),
which was administratively joined with the State Administration for Coal Mine
Safety Supervision (SACMSS), was responsible for providing a nationwide
framework for work safety. With enactment of the Work Safety Act in 2002, the
Government gave SAWS/SACMSS a specific, detailed legal framework for its
responsibilities. SAWS/SACMSS staffed nearly 70 field offices throughout the
country. The Ministry of Health was responsible for prevention and treatment of
occupational illness. Some provincial and local governments have followed the
national pattern of establishing separate work safety agencies. However,
enforcement of national health and safety standards, which was the
responsibility of governments below the national level, remained very weak.
Workplace health and safety did not improve significantly during the year,
and there continued to be a high rate of industrial accidents. According to
official statistics, from January to September, there were 10,227 work-related
accidents, resulting in 11,449 deaths, compared with 13,960 workplace accidents,
resulting in 14,924 deaths, in 2002. Coalmines were by far the most deadly
workplaces. In the first three quarters of the year, 2,802 coal mine accidents
caused 4,620 fatalities. Coalmine accidents comprised approximately 27 percent
of all non-traffic, non-fire-related workplace accidents, but accounted for
approximately 40 percent of corresponding workplace deaths. Enterprise owners
and managers sometimes failed to report accidents and health problems. Local
officials also often underreported such incidents. As a result, the actual
number of workplace deaths and casualties was likely far higher.
The high rate of coal mining accidents highlighted serious enforcement
problems in that sector. However, government officials and media have been
increasingly vocal about the need to control workplace accidents and
increasingly frank in assessing blame. In May, following a major coalmine
disaster in a state-owned mine in Anhui Province, SAWS/SACMSS Administrator Wang
Xianzheng publicly criticized mine operation failures for the accident. In
recent years, the Government has closed tens of thousands of small coalmines,
many of them illegal operations, where the majority of accidents and casualties
occurred. Despite these efforts, many mines reopened illegally soon after
closing. Observers attributed the enforcement problem in the coal mining sector
primarily to corruption, a need to sustain employment in poor areas where many
of the most dangerous mines were located, and a paucity of inspectors.
Fewer than half of rural enterprises met national dust and poison standards.
Many factories that used harmful products, such as asbestos, not only failed to
protect their workers against the ill effects of such products, but also failed
to inform them about the hazards.
Approximately 44.1 million workers reportedly participated in the country's
new work-injury insurance system at the end of 2002. In recent years, small but
growing numbers of workers also began to use lawsuits to pursue work injury and
illness claims against employers.
f. Trafficking in Persons
The law prohibits trafficking in women and children; however, trafficking in
persons and the abduction of women for trafficking remained serious problems.
The country was both a source and destination country for trafficking in
persons. Most trafficking was internal for the purpose of providing lower-middle
income farmers with brides or sons, but a minority of cases involved trafficking
of women and girls into forced prostitution in urban areas, and some reports
suggested that some victims, especially children, were sold into forced labor.
Internal trafficking was a significant problem. The Ministry of Public
Security estimated that 9,000 women and 1,000 children were kidnapped and sold
illegally each year.
Some experts suggested that the serious imbalance in sex ratios in some
regions (see Section 1.f.) had created a situation in which the demand for
marriageable women could not be met by local brides, thus fueling the demand for
abducted women. The problem of a shortage of marriageable women was exacerbated
by the tendency for many village women to leave rural areas to seek employment.
In addition, the cost of traditional betrothal gifts given to a bride's family
sometimes exceeded the price of a trafficked bride and thus made purchasing a
bride more attractive to poor rural families. Some families addressed the
problem of a shortage of women by recruiting women in economically less advanced
areas. Others sought help from criminal gangs, which either kidnapped women and
girls or tricked them by promising them jobs and an easier way of life and then
transported them far from their home areas for delivery to buyers. Once in their
new "family," these women were "married" and raped. Some accepted their fate and
joined the new community; others struggled and were punished. Many kidnappings
reportedly also occurred in provinces where the male to female ratio was
generally balanced.
There were reports that women and girls from Burma, Laos, North Korea,
Vietnam, and Russia were trafficked into the country either to work in the sex
trade or to be forced to marry Chinese men. Trafficking of North Korean women
and girls into the country to work in the sex industry was reportedly widespread
in the northeastern part of the country; border guards reportedly were involved.
Many such women, unable to speak Chinese, were virtual prisoners. Others stayed
in their new situation because the country was less poverty-stricken than North
Korea. A few of the Korean women were sold against their will to rural men in
both ethnic Korean and ethnic Han areas. Others ended up working as prostitutes.
According to press reports, North Korean brides were sold for approximately $38
(RMB 315) to $150 (RMB 1,245). Women reportedly also were trafficked from
Vietnam into the country for purposes of forced marriage.
Chinese citizens were trafficked from the country for sexual exploitation and
indentured servitude in domestic service, sweatshops, restaurants, and other
services. There were reports that Chinese citizens were trafficked to Australia,
Belgium, Burma, Canada, Hungary, Italy, Japan (illegal immigrants held in debt
bondage), Malaysia, the Netherlands (for the purpose of sexual exploitation),
Singapore, Sri Lanka (for sexual exploitation), Taiwan, the United Kingdom (for
sexual exploitation), and the United States. A large number of citizens were
trafficked through Hong Kong.
Alien smuggling rings often had ties to organized crime and were
international in scope. Persons trafficked by alien smugglers paid high prices
for their passage to other countries, where they hoped that their economic
prospects would improve. There were credible reports that some promised to pay
from $30,000 to $50,000 (RMB 248,000 to 415,000) each for their passage. Upon
arrival, many reportedly were forced to repay the traffickers for the smuggling
charges by working in specified jobs for a set period of time. They often also
were forced to pay charges for living expenses out of their meager earnings. The
conditions under which these trafficked persons had to live and work were
generally poor, and they were often required to work long hours. The smuggling
rings that trafficked them often restricted their movements, and their travel
documents, which were often fraudulent, frequently were confiscated. Victims of
trafficking faced threats of being turned in to the authorities as illegal
immigrants and threats of retaliation against their families at home if they
protested the situation in which they found themselves. Persons who were
trafficked from the country and then repatriated sometimes faced fines for
illegal immigration upon their return; after a second repatriation, such persons
could be sentenced to reeducation through labor. Alien smugglers were fined
$6,000 (RMB 49,600), and most were sentenced to up to 3 years in prison; some
have been sentenced to death.
Kidnapping and the buying and selling of children continued to occur,
particularly in poorer rural areas. There were no reliable estimates of the
number of children trafficked. Domestically, most trafficked children were sold
to couples unable to have children; in particular, boys were trafficked to
couples unable to have a son. However, baby girls also were trafficked. In
March, police found 28 girls packed in suitcases on a bus going from Guangxi
Province to Anhui Province apparently for sale. The oldest was 3 months of age;
one baby died en route. Children were also trafficked for labor purposes.
Children trafficked to work usually were sent from poorer interior areas to
relatively more prosperous areas; traffickers reportedly often enticed parents
to relinquish their children with promises of large remittances that their
children would be able to send to them. The Ministry of Public Security uses DNA
technology to confirm parentage, operating a national DNA databank.
The purchase of women was not criminalized until 1991, with the enactment of
the NPC Standing Committee's "Decision Relating to the Severe Punishment of
Criminal Elements Who Abduct and Kidnap Women and Children." This decision made
abduction and sale separate offenses.
Arrests of traffickers have decreased from the peak in 2000, when a
nationwide crackdown was initiated. That year, more than 19,000 persons were
arrested and more than 11,000 were sentenced to punishments, including, in a few
cases, the death penalty. According to official media reports, 110,000 women and
13,000 children who had been abducted were rescued in 2000. In 2002, official
statistics indicate that authorities registered 1,897 cases involving
trafficking of women and children (54.6 percent fewer than reported in 2000);
uncovered 1,585 new cases of trafficking (56.2 percent fewer than in 2000); and
rescued a total of 11,000 trafficked women and children.
Despite government efforts to eliminate trafficking in women and children,
the problem persisted. Demand far outstripped the available supply, making
trafficking a profitable enterprise for those willing to risk arrest and
prosecution. The Government also continued to struggle with the pervasive
problem of official corruption, as demonstrated by the prosecution and
sentencing of over 83,000 officials on corruption-related charges in 1998-2002
(see Section 3). There were reports of complicity of local officials in the
related problem of alien smuggling, as well as reports of the complicity of
local officials in prostitution, which sometimes involved trafficked women.
Disregard of the law also manifested itself at the village level, where village
leaders have in some cases sought to prevent police from rescuing women who have
been sold as brides to villagers.
Agencies involved in combating trafficking included the Ministry of Public
Security, the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the
Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Central Office in Charge of Comprehensive
Management of Public Order, and the Legislative Office of the State Council.
Some victims of domestic trafficking were given assistance and returned to their
homes. It was Central Government policy to provide funds to provincial and local
police to house victims and return them to their homes. Government-funded
women's federation offices provided counseling on legal rights, including the
options for legal action against traffickers, to some victims. The All-China
Women's Federation assisted victims in obtaining medical and psychological
treatment.